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Despite the promises of equal opportunity for women signalled by the
passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),' little
progress in the creditable realization of this goal occurred in intercollegiate
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1. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title IX, 86 Stat. 374 (codified as
amended in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 and scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
Initially, it was unclear whether Title IX applied to intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics
programs. Notably, in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984), the Supreme Court
of the United States held that Title IX did not apply to programs like athletics that do not
receive direct financial assistance.
However, Congress then passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687-88; 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794; 42 U.S.C. §§
2000d-4a, 6107 (1994)), which became effective on March 22, 1988, superseding Grove City Col-
lege and providing that all aspects of an institution of higher education are covered by Title
IX. Thus, since most institutions receive federal funds in some form, by implication, their
athletic programs have been subject to Title IX since March 22, 1988. See, e.g., Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
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or interscholastic athletics between 1972 and 1992.2 This lack of progress was
2. Some commentators attribute part of the past failures of women to achieve greater
protection under Title IX to neglect in enforcement actions by the Office for Civil Rights of
the United States Department of Education (OCR). Ellen J. Vargyas, as senior counsel of the
National Women's Law Center, stated, "there's a gap that has clearly shown up in these
court cases that proves to us that the OCR isn't doing what it should and what it can to
make sure that institutions are complying with the law." Debra E. Blum, Civil Rights Office
Urged to Heed Results of 2 Recent Sex Bias Cases, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Sept.
15, 1993, at A40. Moreover, Arthur Bryant, a leading legal advocate for plaintiffs in Title IX
actions, stated in 1993 that "there are massive violations of Title IX taking place," and said he
believed such violations existed partially because the Department of Education has been lax in
enforcement. Andrew Blum, Athletics In the Court, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 1, 30.
In Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993), the defendants
emphasized that in 1989 the OCR had advised Colorado State University (CSU) that it had
provided "valid, non-discriminatory reasons" for not reaching its participation goals and that
the OCR was terminating its monitoring of the institution given its "good faith efforts to
increase athletic opportunities for female student athletes." Id. at 1516. Nevertheless, after
noting "with all due respect" to these conclusions of the then Regional Director of the OCR,
the court found that the University had failed to meet the standard of "substantial propor-
tionality." Id. The OCR recently announced plans to "beef up" its enforcement actions in
intercollegiate athletics. Debra E. Blum, New Head of Civil-Rights Office Vows to Get Tough on
College Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Sept. 15, 1993, at A39-A40. Others
point to historical control of the administration of intercollegiate athletics by men and the
dominance of the sport of football. MARIAH B. NELSON, THE STRONGER WOMEN GET, THE MORE
MEN LOVE FOOTBALL 23 (1994). Whatever the reason, women have largely been
underrepresented in intercollegiate athletics. A National Collegiate Athletic Association (NC-
AA) study conducted in 1991 showed that although undergraduate enrollment was evenly
divided, men constituted 69.5% of the participants in intercollegiate athletics and their pro-
grams received 70% of athletic scholarship funds, 77% of athletic operating budgets, and 83%
of recruiting money. Phyllis L. Howlett & James J. Whalen, Gender-Equity Task Force Final
Report, NCAA NEWS (Overland Park, Kan.), Aug. 4, 1993, at 14 [hereinafter Task Force Re-
port]. Similar issues also existed on the high school level where 3.4 million males then partici-
pated in athletics as compared with 1.9 million females. Id.
Indeed, a study by the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of
Texas concluded that "the OCR has failed to provide effective and adequate enforcement and
guidance consistent with the letter and spirit of Title IX." LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, GENDER EQUITY IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: THE INADEQUACY OF TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT BY
THE U.S. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 1 (1993) [hereinafter JOHNSON STUDY]. For example, in examin-
ing athletic financial assistance, the OCR, through the use of statistical significance tests, has
found compliance even though males received far more scholarship dollars. Id. at 8. These
tests are known as the "z" test and the "t" test:
The "z" test is used to determine whether the difference between the percentage
of total aid awarded to athletes of one sex and the percentage of participants of
that sex in the athletics program is significant. It may be conducted using the par-
ticipant and financial aid data from either the men's program or the women's
program, but the test need not be conducted for both programs. The "t" test is
used to determine whether the difference between the average award to male and
female athletes is significant.
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979) [hereinafter
Policy Interpretation], reprinted in VALERIE M. BONNETIE, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE DEPART-
MENT OF EDUCATION, TITLE IX ATHLETICS MANUAL 153 (1990) [hereinafter INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL],
and promulgated in accordance with the regulations of the OCR set forth in 34 C.F.R.
106.37(c), 106.41 (a)-(c) (1995).
Moreover, the Johnson Study found several examples where the OCR had tolerated
wide disparities in coaching and publicity. JOHNSON STUDY at 8-9. Opportunity to receive
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unfortunate.3 In many ways, most women were still on the sidelines.
However, recent judicial decisions have allowed many, but certainly not
all, women to leave the sidelines and enter the playing fields as equals. By
virtue of three landmark cases, Cohen v. Brown,4 Roberts v. Colorado State
coaching, assignment and compensation of coaches, and publicity are among the areas of
supportive resources required under the Athletic Regulations adopted pursuant to Title IX. 34
C.F.R. § 106.41 [hereinafter Athletic Regulations]; see infra note 128. In fact, with respect to
Colorado State University, the OCR stated:
This office has a genuine respect for the efforts of the University and commends
its Title IX Committee and Department of Athletics for the commitment that ulti-
mately achieved compliance with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. [§§] 1681 and 1682, and its implementing regulation, 34 C.F.R. Part 106.
Because the University continues to demonstrate good faith efforts to increase athletic
opportunities for female student athletes, we are terminating our monitoring proce-
dures effective the date of this letter.
Letter from Gilbert D. Roman, Regional Director of the Office for Civil Rights of the United
States Department of Education, to Dr. Philip D. Austin, President of Colorado State Universi-
ty D-3 (March 8, 1989) (on file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy) (emphasis add-
ed).
Thus, Colorado State University had reason to believe that its decision to eliminate
men's baseball (55 participants) and women's softball (18 participants) would pass legal re-
view. Indeed, since three times as many positions were eliminated for men, the action had
the net effect of increasing the percentage of athletes who were female. See Brief of Colorado
State Bd. of Agric. at 9-11, Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.
1993) (Nos. 93-1052, 93-1086).
3. This statement and many of the other ideas expressed in this Article may surprise
persons who assume that those who have vigorously defended an institution in a Title IX
case are not personally committed to the expansion of opportunities, athletic and otherwise,
for women. However, such litigation often involves issues of educational autonomy and the
need for legal certainty that do not reflect a particular position on gender opportunity. Al-
though the authors strongly defended the actions of the institution in Roberts, they firmly
believe that
as a matter of public policy, the involvement of young women in intercollegiate and
interscholastic athletics should be encouraged to the greatest extent possible. The
authors also believe that there are some very real problems with the status quo in
intercollegiate and interscholastic athletics and that, as a matter of public policy,
certain changes need to be made. However, the authors believe that changes in
public policy in the area of intercollegiate and interscholastic athletics should come
primarily from the Congress, the state legislatures, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, the Conferences, and the institutions with athletic programs and not
from the federal judiciary.
William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, Cohen v. Brown and the Future of Intercollegiate and Inter-
scholastic Athletics, 84 EDUC. L. REP. 611, 614 n.22 (1993). Moreover, as is reflected in this Arti-
cle, the authors are equally committed to the idea that every person, regardless of gender,
should be encouraged and assisted in reaching his or her potential and that all persons are
entitled to learn, work, and play in a non-hostile environment.
4. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Brown I), affd 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993) (Brown II) (collectively referred to as Brown). On remand, following the affirmance
of the grant of the preliminary injunction by the court of appeals, the district court consid-
ered the case on its merits and held that Brown University had violated Title IX. Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (Brown III). The court ordered Brown to submit a
comprehensive plan for complying with Title IX within 120 days following issuance of its
decision. Brown III, 879 F. Supp. at 214. Brown responded by submitting a proposal for set-
ting minimum and maximum numbers of participants on men's teams and adding women's
junior varsity teams in the sports of soccer, tennis, and basketball. See BRowN UNIVERSITY,
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Board of Agriculture,' and Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,6 women
who are blessed with great athletic ability have earned a mandate for nu-
merical parity with men in intercollegiate athletic programs. In these three
cases, federal district courts issued injunctions to prevent post-secondary
institutions from eliminating certain women's intercollegiate athletic teams,
7
or reducing them to a lower level status.8 Every decision was affirmed on
appeal.9 The various courts held that the defendant institutions in each of
the three cases had engaged in gender discrimination, prohibited by Title
IX, ° by failing to meet any one of three alternative measures established in
the Policy Interpretation." These three measures, which are designed to be
BROWN UNIVERSITY COMPLIANCE PLAN/1995-1996, at 4-5 (July 7, 1995). At the commencement of
this proceeding, the University partially settled some of the plaintiffs' claims by agreeing to
continue to provide comparable treatment and support to its male and female athletes in such
areas as coaching, recruiting, equipment and facilities. Douglas Lederman, A Key Sports-Equity
Case, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 5, 1994, at A51.
5. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (Roberts I), affd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.) (Roberts
1l), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993) (collectively referred to as Roberts).
6. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.) (Favia I), aff d 7 F.3d 332
(3d Cir. 1993) (Favia II) (collectively referred to as Favia).
7. Roberts involved elimination of the women's softball and men's baseball teams at time
when the enrollment of the institution was 52.1% men and 47.9% women and the ratio of
men to women athletic participants was 64.8% to 35.2%. Roberts I, 814 F. Supp. at 1512.How-
ever, because of the much larger number of male participants in baseball than women partici-
pants in softball, the men's overall participation proportion in athletics was reduced to 62.3%
and the women's proportion was increased to 37.7%. Id.
Favia addressed the termination by the defendant of its women's gymnastics and field
hockey teams and its men's soccer and tennis teams. Prior to this programmatic change, ap-
proximately 62% of the defendant's athletic participants were male and approximately 38%
were female, even though its enrollment ratio by gender was approximately 55% women and
45% men. Favia I, at 580. The change resulted in a slight reduction of the percentage of
women athletic participants to 36% of the total. Id.
8. In Brown, the institution demoted two fully funded women's teams, gymnastics and
volleyball, and two fully funded men's teams, water polo and golf, from varsity to club sta-
tus. Brown I1, 879 F. Supp. at 187. The court found that such action eliminated institutional
funding for all four teams, requiring them to be funded by private donors; impeded them
from maintaining a level of competitiveness that their abilities would otherwise have permit-
ted; and "stripped" them of certain varsity privileges, such as varsity-level coaching and re-
cruiting, and money for equipment, travel, and post-season competition. Id. at 189-90, nn. 7 &
10. Furthermore, the court concluded that even with the inclusion of members of the demoted
teams, the participation ratio was 61.87% for male athletes to 38.13% for women athletes at a
time when the respective enrollment percentages were 51.14% for women and 48.86% for
men. Id., at 192.
9. Brown and Favia involved preliminary injunctions. Roberts involved a permanent in-
junction. Following the affirmances, Favia settled, and Brown proceeded to trial where a per-
manent injunction was entered.
10. Title IX simply provides, in part, that:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). -
11. Policy Interpretation, supra note 2 at 71, 418; INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra hote 2, at
21. The three-pronged test was applied in Roberts 1, 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D. Colo. 1993),
Favia 1, 812 F. Supp. 578, 584 (W.D. Pa. 1993), and Brown 1, 809 F. Supp. 978, 985 (D.R.I.
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considered consecutively, attempt to provide for assessment of the opportu-
nity for individuals of both genders to compete in athletic programs by de-
termining:
1. Whether intercollegiate [or interscholastic] level participation opportunities
for male and female students are provided in numbers substantially propor-
tionate to their respective enrollments.
2. Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented
among intercollegiate [or interscholastic] athletes, whether the institution can
show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is de-
monstrably responsive to the developing interests and abilities of that sex.
3. Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate
[or interscholastic] athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. 2
In determining that the institutions did not meet any of these standards, the
federal courts rejected the primary contentions of the defendants that their
actions were necessitated by financial and budgetary considerations.13 In ef-
fect, the decisions in these three cases embraced a "numerical parity para-
digm" where each gender is entitled to equal representation. 14
In a fourth case, Cook v. Colgate University,"5 the district court took a
different approach and focused not on numerical parity, but on whether the
treatment was discriminatory. 6 In effect, the Colgate court embraced a "non-
1992).
12. Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 21.
13. Roberts 1, 814 F. Supp. at 1518; Favia I, 812 F. Supp. at 585; Brown 1, 809 F. Supp. at
1000.
14. The term "numerical parity paradigm" is entirely the creation of the authors. As ex-
plained in more detail infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text, the numerical parity para-
digm focuses on objective criteria such as number of participants or amount of money spent
It ignores subjective criteria such as how people are treated and whether the environment is
hostile.
15. 802 F. Supp 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (Colgate 1), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993) (Colgate
I) (collectively referred to as Colgate).
16. The court held that Colgate had violated Title IX by failing to provide equivalent
benefits in athletic opportunities to members of the women's club team. Colgate 1, 802 F.
Supp. at 743; see also Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,421. In reaching this conclusion,
the court borrowed the three-step "burden shifting" test from two Title VII cases, McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981), which the court termed the "McDonnell-Burdine"
standard, Colgate 1, 802 F. Supp. at 743, requiring (1) that a prima fade case of discrimination
be established by a plaintiff, (2) that the defendant then come forward with evidence of some
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct, and (3) that if the defendant establishes
such reasons, the plaintiff must then show that the reasons advanced are "pretextual or a
cover-up for a discriminatory decision." Id. Using this test as the linchpin of its analysis, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of gender discrimination
under Title IX by showing that the men's team received 50 times as much financial support
as the women's team, and that the members of the men's team enjoyed significantly more
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discrimination paradigm" where a person cannot be treated differently sim-
ply because of his or her gender.17 However, this decision was later vacated
on appeal on mootness grounds due to the graduation of all of the plaintiffs
from Colgate." Thus, the appellate courts never addressed the propriety of
the district court's embrace of the non-discrimination paradigm.
Unless overturned by Congress or the Supreme Court, 9 the three nu-
merical parity decisions and several settlements of other recent Title IX ac-
tions by institutions2' send a powerful message regarding accountability for
women's rights to the athletic administrators of American colleges and uni-
versities.2' Although some litigation in this struggle is still pending,22 and
favorable treatment than the plaintiffs in terms of equipment, locker room facilities, travel
arrangements and accommodations, practice times, and coaching. Id. at 744-45. The court then
concluded that the reasons advanced by the defendant for its refusal to afford varsity status
to the women's team, including claims of insufficiency of competition, student interest, ability,
and. qualified players, were not legitimate non-discriminatory justifications and were pretextual
in nature. Id. at 745-49.
17. The term "non-discrimination paradigm" is entirely the creation of the authors. As ex-
plained in more detail infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text, the non-discrimination para-
digm focuses on subjective or "holistic" criteria and ensures that there is no overt or covert
gender discrimination in either participation opportunities or treatment. It tends to ignore raw
numbers such as participation or financial levels.
18. Colgate II, 992 F.2d at 19-20.
19. " Congress has overturned Supreme Court decisions in the past. For example, Congress
passed legislation overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). See supra note
1. In addition, several Supreme Court decisions have been overturned by congressionally ini-
tiated constitutional amendments. For example, U.S. CONST. amend. XI overruled Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); U.S. CONST amend. XIV, §1 overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856); U.S. CONST amend. XVI overruled Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429 (1895); and U.S. CONST amend. XXVI, §1 overruled Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970).
20. The most highly publicized settlements involved Auburn University and the Universi-
ty of Texas. Auburn reportedly agreed to add a women's soccer team with fully-funded schol-
arships, to provide $400,000 over the succeeding two-year period to soccer and women's ath-
letics generally, and to pay the plaintiffs $140,000 in damages, costs, and attorneys fees. ELLEN
J. VARGYAS, BREAKING DowN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE IX 43-44 (1994). Texas agreed to
increase the proportion of participation of its varsity women from 23% to 44% by the 1996-97
school year and to assure equitable treatment of its female athletes with regard to scholar-
ships, facilities, and other areas in its intercollegiate athletics program. See id. at 44; Office of
the Attorney General, State of Texas, Morales Settles Lawsuit Over Women's Athletics at UT, July
15; 1993, at 1 (press release) (on file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy).
21. Some of these former adversaries have taken significant actions to assure compliance.
For example, in its 1993-94 academic year, Colorado State University, whose governing board
was the defendant in Roberts, achieved a women's varsity participation rate of 47% compared
to a women's full time undergraduate enrollment rate of 48%, leaving a gap of only 1% for
achieving absolute numerical parity in terms of the "substantial proportionality" test. Tony
Phifer & Renee Carlson, CSU Reaches Gender Equity in Athletics, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, May
23, 1994, at Al. This test requires that intercollegiate (or interscholastic) level participation
opportunities for male and female students be provided in numbers substantially proportion-
ate to their respective enrollments, and constitutes one of the three alternative means for
assessing compliance with Title IX under the Athletic Regulations of the OCR. Athletic Regu-
lations, supra note 2, § 106.41(c)(1); infra note 128. Moreover, the institution has enhanced its
services and general program components for women and has voluntarily chosen to construct
a women's softball playing facility. In the same year in which it achieved or initiated these
gains in gender equity, the University demonstrated the viability of also being able to field a
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although many question the courts' embrace of the numerical parity para-
digm, especially in light of the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements
on race,2 the strength of the mandate to date is undeniable."' News ac-
counts and scholarly articles have also revealed settlements by the California
State University System, Cornell University, the University of New Hamp-
shire, Eastern Kentucky University, the University of Massachusetts at Am-
herst, the University of Oklahoma, the University of New Mexico, Virginia
successful football team by winning its conference championship for the first time and playing
in a major bowl game. In a number of public pronouncements during the course of the Rob-
erts litigation, University officials emphasized that the institution's position was based philo-
sophically on two issues: (1) what are the specific legal requirements for intercollegiate athlet-
ics under Title IX, and (2) how much flexibility does an institution of higher education have
in determining its manner of compliance, or must this decision be made by judicial directive?
Tony Balandran, Softball Teams Bats 1.000, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, Mar. 12, 1993, at Al;
Debra E. Blum, Judge Tells Colorado State to Reinstate Women's Softball, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc.
(Washington, D.C.), Mar. 3, 1993, at A40.
Colorado Attorney General Gale A. Norton, the elected official responsible for defending
the governing board in Roberts I and //, concurred in the need for resolution of these ques-
tions. See Jennifer Gavin, State's Legal Costs Swell, DENY. POST, Dec. 26, 1993, at 1. See also an
editorial in the Denver Post written by the President of CSU, Albert C. Yates, Attorney General
Served Colorado Well in CSU Case, DENY. POST, Mar. 12, 1994. Following Brown I and Roberts II,
the Attorney General assigned members of her staff, including one of the authors, to conduct
special briefings for officials of state educational institutions to urge them to comply with the
mandates of Title IX. The staff members were also asked by her to provide assistance to such
institutions in interpreting and meeting requirements of this law identified in various letters
of findings from the OCR.
22. The authors expect that ultimately the United States Supreme Court will be asked to
review the Brown University decision even though the high court has refused to hear both
Roberts II and Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. W. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265
(7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995) (Kelley). They also believe that Supreme
Court resolution of the issues is essential to assuring that all intercollegiate athletic programs
operate under the same parameters. If the athletes prevail, it will be imprudent for institu-
tions to ignore the recent cases. On the other hand, if the institution prevails, advocates of
opportunity for women in sports will likely seek legislation to overturn the decision as -they
did after the Grove City College decision.
23. Implicit in the numerical parity paradigm decisions are the beliefs that groups, rather
than individuals, are entitled to protection and that it is acceptable to disadvantage the
overrepresented gender so as to "atone for previous sins" against the underrepresented gen-
der. However, in the last weeks of its 1994-95 Term, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the idea that the Equal Protection Clause protects groups, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peita,
115 S. Ct. 2097, 2100 (1995), and also rejected the notion that disadvantaging one race to
atone for the previous discrimination against another race was acceptable, id. at 2114, 2119
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that there is no debtor or creditor race); id. at 2119 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating that there is no racial paternalism exception to the Equal Protection
Clause); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (invalidating congressional districts designed
to maximize the number of racial minorities elected to Congress). While these cases concerned
race and not gender, the application of their principles in the context of Title IX and intercol-
legiate athletics could cast serious doubt on the continued validity of the numerical parity
decisions.
24. See Debra E. Blum, Civil-Rights Office Urged to Heed Results of 2 Recent Sex-Bias Suits,
CHRON. HIGHER EDuc. (Washington, D.C.), Sept. 15, 1993, at A40, where the author states that
"federal courts have taken their swings" at Title IX enforcement and notes that "courts can
take several actions that the civil-rights office cannot, including issuing injunctive relief orders
and awarding attorney's fees and damages to a plaintiff." Id.
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Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the College of William and
Mary.21
Accordingly, women athletes have achieved a major victory in securing
the imposition of an affirmative obligation upon educational institutions to
find places for them in much larger numbers in their intercollegiate athletics
programs.26 They have also achieved a symbolic conquest of the male ath-
letic establishment and the "old boy" network which have controlled such
programs from their inception.
25. See VARGYAS, supra, note 20, at 42 (discuSsing the Auburn University and Colorado
State University settlements); Jill K. Johnson, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial
Interpretation of the Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REv. 553, 589 n.195 (1994) (discussing
the Cornell University, University of Oklahoma, William and Mary College, University of
New Hampshire, and University of Massachusetts at Amherst settlements); David Barron, Title
IX Battleground, HOUSTON CHRON., June 27, 1993, at B8 (discussing the New Mexico and Eastern
Kentucky settlements); Debra E. Blum, Virginia Tech Will Add 2 Women's Sports To Settle Suit,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Feb. 24, 1995, at A40 (discussing the Virginia Poly-
technic Institute and State University settlement); Debra E. Blum, Big Step for Sex Equity,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUc. (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1993, at A35 (discussing the California State
University System settlement); Office of the Attorney General, State of Texas, Morales Settles
Lawsuit Over Women's Athletics at UT, July 15, 1993, at 1 (press release) (on file with the Duke
Journal of Gender Law & Policy) (discussing the University of Texas settlement).
26. It is clear that Title IX originally was intended to eliminate discrimination, not to
mandate affirmative action. For example, the Title IX statute itself, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b), pro-
vides that Title IX will not be interpreted to require affirrmative action to correct an imbalance
that may exist between the sexes. While the first proposed regulations, which were published
in June of 1974, would have required affirmative action efforts to equalize the numbers of
athletic opportunities, the final regulations, which were promulgated in June of 1975, explicitly
deleted the requirement for affirmative efforts in the absence of a specific finding of discrimi-
nation. Compare 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228, 22,236 (1974) with 45 C.F.R. § 86.38 (1995). In addition,
the athletic financial assistance regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (1995), assumes that the par-
ticipation rate will be different from the enrollment rate when it provides that scholarship
money must be proportional to participation, not enrollment. Moreover, a September 1975
memorandum to college and university presidents made clear that "neither quotas nor fixed
percentages are required." Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Civil Rights, De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare to College and University Presidents 8 (1975) (on
file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy). Furthermore, the proposed policy interpre-
tation, issued in December 1978, emphasized that Title IX did not require an equal number of
men and women participants or an equal number of women's sports. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1995).
Rather, the interests of the two sexes had to be effectively accommodated. In addition, the
1980 Investigator's Manual stated that Title IX does not require institutions to align enrollment
with participation. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 2; at 122. Prior to the recent Title IX
litigation, the OCR found several institutions to be in compliance with respect to interests and
abilities even in the presence of a large gap between participation and enrollment. In some
instances compliance was inferred even though the gap exceeded 21 percentage points. See
JOHNSON STUDY, supra note 2, at 7.
27. See Joan S. Hult, The Story of Women's Athletics: Manipulating a Dream 1890-1985, in
WOMEN AND SPORT 83, 100 (D. Margaret Costa & Sharon R. Guthrie eds., 1994); MARIAH B.
NELSON, ARE WE WINNING YET?: WOMEN ARE CHANGING SPORTS AND SPORTS ARE CHANGING WOMEN
159 (1991); see also Christine Black & Mary Curtis, Women in Sports, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER
EDUc., Dec. 2, 1993, at 25, which contends that women have a better chance of becoming
president of a Division I NCAA institution than becoming its athletic director. This assertion
is apparently predicated upon data showing that more women are currently serving as presi-
dents than as athletic directors in such institutions. The article notes that in the prior ten
years, women filled only 22% of 812 coaching positions and that as of 1992, less than 24% of
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However, despite the achievement of female-male numerical parity28 in
some intercollegiate athletics programs through recent litigation under Title
IX, numerous questions remain as to whether an unacceptable atmosphere of
both explicit and implicit discrimination29 continues to haunt intercollegiate
athletic programs." Cohen, Roberts, and Favia, all of which focus exclusively
on numbers of participants, do not meaningfully address these issues.31
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it questions whether, de-
spite the massive gains realized for participation of elite and exceptional
athletes in recent gender-equity cases, many women are still "left on the
sidelines" because of judicial failure to address the overall issue of the treat-
ment of women students who wish to participate in some form of athletic
competition, such as club and intramural sports.32 In essence, the courts
have ignored most of the issues relating to discrimination and have focused
almost exclusively on raw numbers. Moreover, the courts have focused on
the rights of groups while ignoring the concerns of individuals.' While rec-
college sports operation budgets were allocated to women's sports. During the intense litiga-
tion surrounding Title IX, some officials of institutions of higher education with strong foot-
ball programs discussed possible secession from the NCAA because of their concern over
potential rigidity in the definition of gender equity being discussed by a special task force of
that body. See Douglas Lederman, Angry Football Coaches Talk of Leaving NCAA Over Its Sex
Equity Proposal, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc. (Washington, D.C.), June 30, 1993, at A29.
28. For purposes of this Article, the term "parity" means that the same number of oppor-
tunities are available to each gender.
29. For purposes of this Article, the term "discrimination" refers to treating persons dif-
ferently solely because of differences in gender. In other words, it focuses on inclusiveness of
non-elite athletes and fairness of treatment for women in intercollegiate sports.
30. As explained infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text, female intercollegiate athletes
are frequently treated like "second class citizens."
31. As explained infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text, the courts chose to focus ex-
clusively on numbers of female intercollegiate athletes.
32. Current litigation relating to compliance in athletics under Title IX has been predicat-
ed exclusively on gender equity for the elite and exceptional male and female athletes partici-
pating or seeking to participate in intercollegiate programs. See cases cited supra notes 4-6.
Such athletes comprise less than 6.4% of total enrolled students. Memorandum from Todd
Petr, Assistant Director of Research of the NCAA, to Christine Susemihl, Director of Compli-
ance, Athletic Department, Colorado State University 1 (Jan. 30, 1995) (on file with the Duke
Journal of Gender Law & Policy). Scant judicial and regulatory attention has been given to the
need for accommodation of the interest and abilities in athletics of the vast number of re-
maining students. The specific regulation governing athletics under Title IX provides that "no
person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
be treated differently from another person or otherwise discriminated against in any interscho-
lastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient [of federal financial
aid]." Athletic Regulations, supra note 2, § 106.41(a) (emphasis added).
According to Will Holsbury, Executive Director of the National Intramural & Recreation-
al Sport Association, no reliable data exists for determination of the overall participation by
college or university students in intramural or club sports, either in the aggregate or by gen-
der. Letter from Jayleen Heft, Assistant to the General Counsel, Colorado State University, to
Brian A. Snow, General Counsel, Colorado State University 1 (Jan. 25, 1995) (on file with the
Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy). Therefore, no basis exists for concluding that institutions
of higher education are in compliance with Title D with respect to the vast number of their
enrolled students (approximately 93% of the total) who are not participants in intercollegiate
athletics.
33. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause protects indi-
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ognizing the significance of these cases, we propose that the courts reach
beyond the numerical parity paradigm to the broader issues encompassed in
the non-discrimination paradigm. If all persons are to be treated as individu-
als and judged solely on "the content of their character,"' and if "everyday
people" can live their "lives of dignity and decency,"' it is essential that
these issues be addressed and resolved.
Second, this Article promulgates a new legal theory, gender depreciation,
that will permit greater development and enforcement of the ideals of the
non-discrimination paradigm in the context of Title IX. Drawing on analogies
to recent sexual harassment and discrimination cases under Title VII and
Title IX,6 we call for expansion of existing legal remedies for persons who
are depreciated and devalued because of their gender. This expansion is
expected to provide new avenues for monetary recovery or injunctive relief
with respect to practices which explicitly and implicitly relegate persons to
"second class" status simply because of their gender.
These dual purposes are accomplished in five distinct sections. The first
section explains in greater detail what is meant by the numerical parity and
non-discrimination paradigms. This section also analyzes the various opin-
ions in Roberts and Colgate as a means of demonstrating the weaknesses of
the numerical parity paradigm and the potential strengths of the non-dis-
crimination paradigm. The second section explains the implications of the
judiciary's embrace of the numerical parity paradigm. The third section ex-
plores the nature of the existing injustices in intercollegiate athletics that
have been ignored by the judiciary's embrace of the numerical parity para-
digm. The fourth section develops the gender depreciation theory by drawing
on the current state of the law of sexual harassment and discrimination un-
der Titles VII 7 and IX and the Equal Protection Clause,' and suggests a
means of applying that theory in litigation. The final section presents some
recommendations for the achievement of gender equity in intercollegiate
athletics in general and the implementation of the gender depreciation theory
in particular.39
viduals, not groups. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2100 (1995).
34. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to the Civil Rights March on Washington, in Jim BISHOP,
THE DAYS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 327-29 (1971).
35. Cornel West, Malcolm X and Black Rage, in RACE MATTERS 135, 150 (1994).
36. See infra, notes 155-158, 170-174.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
39. Although the authors' recommendations are confined to the context of intercollegiate
athletics, most of the recommendations would be equally applicable in the context of inter-
scholastic athletics.
Volume 3:1 1996
STILL ON THE SIDELINES 11
II. THE DEFINITIONS OF THE NUMERICAL PARITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
PARADIGMS
With respect to educational programs receiving federal funds,' Title
IX, on its face, simply mandates that persons be treated equally regardless of
gender." However, we have identified two separate and distinct paradigms
for implementing this mandate.'
On one hand, Title IX is a mandate for a numerical parity paradigm,'3
whereby each gender is proportionately represented in each and every edu-
cational program." Implicit in this paradigm is the assump tion that one
gender must be advantaged, at least on a temporary basis, to overcome prior
discrimination against it.' This paradigm focuses on objective criteria such
as the number of participants.' When taken to its logical conclusion, the
numerical parity paradigm results in numerical or financial quotas.47 For
example, if the programs are co-educational," then each gender's represen-
40. Title IX expressly applies only to institutions that receive federal funds. 20 U.S.C. §
1681.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42. These two paradigms could also be used to implement Title VI or any other mandate
which declares that persons shall not be treated differently. For example, the idea of racial
quotas or of structuring congressional districts so as to maximize the number of racial minori-
ties elected is an embrace of the numerical parity paradigm. In contrast, the idea of subjecting
racial set asides to justification through a strict scrutiny test is an embrace of the nn-discrim-
ination paradigm. See Adarand Contructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-14 (1995).
43. As explained infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text, the numerical parity paradigm
has received the most attention to date.
44. As explained infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text, this is precisely the holding of
the intercollegiate athletics cases. In other words, if women make up 50% of the total enrolled
students, then women must be 50% of the athletes unless valid non-discriminatory reasons
can be articulated. Essentially, this is a mandate for a quota. Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (stating
that Title IX is not to be construed as mandating a quota).
45. For example, since women were not allowed to have athletic teams for several de-
cades, it is acceptable to cut men's teams while adding women. See Kelley v. Board of Trust-
ees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
938 (1995); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993); cf. Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihere can be no such
thing as either a debtor or a creditor race.").
46. In this respect, the parity paradigm is very easy to measure. It is quite simple to
count the number of male and female persons in an athletic program or in an academic pro-
gram. As explained infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text, if the numbers are approximate
to the respective proportions in enrollment by gender, there is no violation.
47. This is effectively what has happened in the context of intercollegiate athletics. An in-
stitution must distribute athletic opportunities to each gender in approximate proportion to
each gender's representation in the full time undergraduate student body. If this proportionali-
ty is not achieved, then the institution must add sports for the underrepresented gender on a
periodic basis until such time as the proportionality is achieved. See infra notes 77-90 and
accompanying text. In short, there is no question that proportionality must be eventually
achieved, the only question is how fast it will be achieved.
48. Under Title IX, the overwhelming majority of educational programs have to be co-
educational. However, single sex classes are allowed in physical education, sports involving
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tation in a given progam 49 must approximate representation in the student
body.5° If the programs are not co-educational,5' then, logically, each gen-
der should be able to participate in the same number of programs. 2 Simi-
larly, each gender is entitled to have the same amount of teaching resources,
both financial and otherwise,' devoted to it and its programs.' As such,
the numerical parity paradigm assumes, at least implicitly, that each gender
has the same interests and desires.' In the numerical parity paradigm at its
bodily contact, and sex education. 45 C.F.R. § 86.34 (c), (e); see also infra notes 61-90 and
accompanying text.
49. Theoretically, Title IX could be interpreted as mandating a specific parity requirement
in every program. Thus, if a university had an aggregate enrollment that was equally divided
by gender, each of its academic units, such as engineering, liberal arts, and education could
be required to include 50% of their respective students from each gender. If the three-pronged
test, supra note 16 and accompanying text, of the athletic model was applied and followed,
these units could alternatively satisfy Title IX by showing continuing expansion, which would
at some future date inevitably require achievement of parity, or it could prove the accommo-
dation of interests and abilities without regard to differences in individual proficiency until
full parity was reached. In the latter case, if enrollment by gender were dominant n a partic-
ular course, such as, for example, a course entitled Gender Sensitivity for Males, the institu-
tion would need to add other courses to meet the interests and abilities of the other gender
even if such courses were not among its curriculum priorities. In other words, some academic
offerings of the institution would not only be student driven, but gender driven.
50. The athletic decisions hold that Title IX means that each gender's representation in
the intercollegiate athletic program should reflect each gender's representation in the student
body. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1512 (D. Colo.), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. 998 F.2d
824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Favia, 812 F. Supp. 578, 584-85 (W.D. Pa.),
affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d. Cir. 1993); Brown I, 809 F. Supp. at 987 (D.R.l. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1993). Thus, the relevant pool for comparison is the institution's student body. Using
the same logic, each gender's representation in the student body should reflect such gender's
representation in the population to be served by the institution. Thus, if the Georgia Institute
of Technology is to serve the people of Georgia and if women make up 50% of the popula-
tion of Georgia, then women should also make up 50% of the student body at the Georgia
Institute of Technology. But cf. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 160 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995) (rejecting the notion that a state university should reflect the
ethnic composition of the state).
51. As explained supra note 48, some programs are not required to be co-educational.
52. In other words, if a school offers three different sex education classes for one gender,
it should offer three different sex education classes for the other gender.
Furthermore, since sports generally are single sex, the mandate would be met if each
gender had the same number of sports. Interestingly, the courts have unequivocally rejected
the notion that the same number of sports constitutes Title IX compliance. Roberts 1, 814 F.
Supp. at 1514 (holding that although Colorado State University offered eight women's sports
and seven men's sports, the school still violated Title IX).
53. This concept is reflected in current litigation involving salaries in which coaches of
women's athletic teams contend that they should have parity with coaches of men's teams.
See, e.g., Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1316-18 (9th Cir. 1994); discussion infra
note 136.
54. Cf. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994) (determining the educational rights
for women in prisons).
55. Some advocates maintain that the assumption is not supported empirically. See, e.g.,
Defendant's Post-Trial Brief at § V, Cohen v. Brown Univ. (U.S. Dist. R.I. 1995) (No. 92-0197-
P). Moreover, men and women do not major in academic disciplines such as engineering and
education in equal numbers. According to statistics obtained from the the United States De-
partment of Education, National Conference for Education Statistics, in 1992, students receiving
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extreme, change is brought about by forcing educational institutions to adopt
rigid numerical quotas for each gender and then, if necessary, finding per-
sons of the appropriate gender to fill the quotas. 6 Persons are valued not
so much for their individuality as for their membership in a particular gen-
der group. 7 However, because of the numerical parity paradigm's emphasis
on rigid goals and quotas,58 actual change occurs quite rapidly. 9 It is
degrees in engineering were 14% female and 86% male. In education, 79% were female and
21% were male. Therefore, a gender is disproportionately represented in such academic offer-
ings. From 1972 to 1992, the percentage of bachelor's degrees received by women in engineer-
ing rose from 1% to 14%; in the physical sciences, from 15% to 33%; and in the bio-
logical/life sciences, from 29% to 52%. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., DIG. OF EDUC. STAT. (U.S.
Dep't of Educ.), October, 1994, at 290, 293, 296.
The parity paradigm sets up a goal that may depend upon reliance upon artificial con-
structs. If the paradigm were applied generally to academic disciplines, and men, for whatev-
er reason, did not wish to become nurses or occupational therapists in the same proportion
as women, educational institutions would encounter difficulty in achieving parity unless they
were to turn away otherwise qualified women. Of course, fairness requires that any such
analysis take into account whether student choices of programs are made freely or simply re-
flect developmental patterns in childhood due to societal proscriptions based on inappropriate
rigidity in defining gender roles.
56. For example, when taken to its logical conclusion, the parity paradigm would assume
that a nursing program consisting of 100 students would have 50 females and 50 males. If
the institution had difficulty finding 50 qualified males, it would use affirmative action and
scholarships to attract male students. Moreover, the institution would cap female enrollment at
50 and turn away all other females so as avoid disturbing the delicate balance between the
genders.
While such bureaucratic rigidity appears to be inconsistent with appropriate academic
governance, it may soon be the norm in intercollegiate athletics, particularly in the so-called
non-revenue sports. Some institutions, such as Colorado State, are severely limiting the num-
ber of male "walk-ons" while actively encouraging an increase in female "walk-ons" as a
means of maintaining proportionality. More commonly, institutions are giving the maximum
number of scholarships to women in some sports while trimming male scholarships to the
bare minimum. See Kelley, 832 F. Supp. 237, 239-40 (C.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989, 992-93, 995
(S.D. Iowa 1993); see also Debra E. Blum, Walk-Ons, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.),
July 14, 1993, at A29 (discussing the futility of using the number of non-scholarship athletes
for each gender as a measurement of each gender's interest in sports); Jeremy L. Milk,
Women's Soccer on a Roll, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 3, 1993, at A39
(asserting that the need to provide more athletic opportunities for women is one factor con-
tributing to the explosion of intercollegiate women's soccer).
57. Thus, the focus is on group rights rather than individual rights. Cf. AYN RAND, AN-
THEM (1946) (describing a society where the worst things are the words "I" and "ego"). But
cf. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[Hlere the individual
is important, not his race, his creed, or his color.").
58. Rigid goals and quotas can be inherently unfair if persons are excluded from partici-
pation in order to meet them. To illustrate, suppose that an institution's student body is 90%
non-Hispanic Caucasian and 10% people of color, and the institution mandates that athletic
opportunities are to be split on the same ratio. If there are 10 spots on the basketball team
and the 10 best basketball players just happen to be African-American, Native American, or
Hispanic, would it be fair to cut 9 of the top 10 and add 9 less able non-Hispanic Cauca-
sians in order to meet a quota? When institutions cut participation or reduce teams based on
gender, a perception of inherent unfairness is likely to ensue. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th
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quite simple to determine what the quota is and to take the appropriate
steps to achieve it. There is no need for a careful and subjective evaluation.
On the other hand, Title IX could be a mandate for a non-discrimina-
tion paradigm whereby an individual cannot be treated differently simply
because of gender.' Implicit in this paradigm is the assumption that indi-
viduals, regardless of gender, should be treated the same. This paradigm
focuses on subjective or "holistic" criteria and ensures that there is no overt
or covert gender discrimination in either participation opportunities or treat-
ment.6' If an industrial arts teacher permits male students in class to peruse
photos in magazines that are demeaning to women or allows off-color jokes,
females are likely to feel unwelcome in the class. On the other hand, if a
home economics teacher makes demeaning remarks about the difficulty
which some males have with fine needlework, then men will be reluctant to
enroll in the course.62 If the educational programs are not co-educational, 3
then each gender must have equal access to similar educational programs
and must not have to undergo undue hardship in order to participate."
Moreover, because of the different ways in which young men and women
are socialized,' the non-discrimination paradigm may require the offering
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). In addition, see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974) (denying certiorari on the grounds of mootness), which involved quotas in academ-
ic admissions on racial grounds, where Justice Douglas in an opinion dissenting from the
decision to deny certiorari, states
[tihe State, however, may not proceed by racial classification to force strict popu-
lation equivalencies for every group in every occupation, overriding individual
preferences. The Equal Protection [Cilause commands the elimination of racial
barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought
to be organized.
Id. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. For example, after losing its Title IX litigation, Colorado State University rapidly took
steps to increase female participation. See Editorial, CSU Athletics Moved Fast to Achieve Gender
Equity, THE FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, May 28, 1994, at A14.
60. In the race context, this non-discrimination paradigm is sometimes referred to as the
"color-blind" society. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 1 (1992).
Recently, the Supreme Court seems to have embraced the non-discrimination paradigm
in the race context. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485-86 (1995); Adarand, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2105.
61. Both paradigms would strike down practices that have the effect of excluding one
gender from educational opportunities. Thus, if a school has a rule that young women cannot
take industrial arts and that young men cannot take home economics, the rule would be
invalidated under either paradigm.
62. Such situations are likely to create a "hostile environment," which is a primary basis
for finding sexual harassment under Title VII and IX. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875
(9th Cir. 1991); cases cited infra note 155.
63. As explained infra notes 184-85, there are situations where the educational opportuni-
ties do not have to be co-educational. See also, supra note 48.
64. This point is best illustrated in the prison context. For example, suppose that there
are an equal number of male and female prisoners. There are 100 female prisoners who wish
to take a course in auto repair and 20 male prisoners who wish to take such a course. Under
the non-discrimination paradigm, it would be permissible to offer three sections of the course
to the women and one section of the course to the men. In theory, the numerical parity para-
digm would require the same number of sections.
65. Since the nineteenth century, various factors have limited women's participation in
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of single sex classes' or even schools 67 in some instances so that every
person can reach his/her potential.' Instead of focusing on equality of
numbers, the non-discrimination paradigm focuses on equality of experienc-
es. Since the emphasis is on quality of experience, this paradigm would re-
quire that the respective coaches and teachers be of equal competence and
competitive sports, including, for example, misunderstandings about women's reproductive
health and a Victorian image of women as fragile and passive. See David L. Diles, Historical
Overview of Title IX, in NATL ASS'N OF COLLEGE AND UNIV. ATrORNEYS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TITLE
IX: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES 3, 10-18 (Walter B. Connoly, Jr. ed., 1995); see also Diane L.
Gill, Psychological Perspectives on Women in Sport and Exercise, in WOMEN AND SPORT 257-58 (D.
Margaret Costa & Sharon R. Guthrie eds., 1994). Moreover, the pressures and incentives
affecting womens' decisions regarding sports begins at a young age.
As girls move through adolescence, they come under increasing pressure to form
a "feminine" identity. Traditional thinking remains pervasive enough to make
many girls shy away from competitive sports. For many boys, the dilemma is the
opposite: how to achieve a masculine identity without sports. The forces keeping
boys in athletics and pushing girls away widen the participation gap long before
college enters the picture.
Matt Lorenz, A Reality-Based Plan for Achieving Gender Equity in College Sports, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2, 1994, at B2.
66. For the most part, policy makers in the public education system in this country have
reached the conclusion that single sex public education is a bad idea. Yet, as explained infra
notes 68-70, for some children, single sex education can be quite beneficial. Thus, the authors
would support single sex public education as an option, but not as a requirement. Those who
do not wish to participate in single sex schools would have the co-educational option avail-
able. If our government is serious about every child reaching his or her full potential, then it
has an obligation to make a variety of educational options, including single sex education,
available to those who would benefit from such opportunities. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§
22-30.5-101 to 5-114 (1994) (repealed by § 22-30.5-114, S.B 93-183, § 1, effective July 1, 1998)
(setting up "charter schools" where innovative approaches can be pursued); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 22-36-101 to 36-116 (1994) (allowing any child to attend any public school in the State).
67. If equal facilities are available for both males and females, then single sex public
schools should pass judicial review. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 885 (3d
Cir. 1976) (allowing an all male public school provided an equal all female facility existed),
affd mem. by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). But see Note, Inner-City Single-Sex
Schools: Educational Reform or Invidious Discrimination, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1747-48 (1992)
(discussing the criticisms and stereotypical implications of Vorchheimer); Deborah L. Rhode,
Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106, 138 (1986) (asserting that the facilities at
issue in Vorchheimer were not equal).
Moreover, lest the authors be regarded as endorsing the results in VMI and Citadel, see
infra note 186, they wish to state unequivocally that, in their view, it is impossible for an
embryonic all-female military academy to offer alternative benefits equal to those available at
well established all-male institutions. See infra note 186 and accompanying text. One cannot
equalize a century and a half of distinguished history overnight. The only way that the mili-
tary academies could be equal is if they had similar legacies of excellence. A new institution
or program simply cannot replicate such a legacy.
68. A variety of different studies conclude that single-sex education is beneficial to female
academic achievement. See, e.g., Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public Single Sex Education, 18
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Fall 1994, at 227, 243; Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Byrk, Effects on
Single-Sex Secondary Schools on Student Achievement and Attitudes, 78 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 381, 381
(1986); Cornelius Riordan, Public and Catholic Schooling: The Effect of Gender Context Policy, 93
Am. J. EDUC. 518, 536 (1985); Barbara S. Powell & Arthur G. Powell, For Girls, Schools of Their
Own, 43 INDEPENDENT SCH. 55, 56-58 (1983); see also Robin Wilson, For Women Only, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), July 28, 1995, at A17.
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experience. As such, it does not assume that men and women will necessar-
ily be equally represented in all activities, but rather assumes that individu-
als who wish to pursue such activities as athletics, industrial arts, music,
physics, competitive dance, rodeo, home economics, or cheerleading will
have the opportunity to do so and enjoy them.69
In the non-discrimination paradigm, change is brought about by requir-
ing the educational institutions to take action to promote full acceptance of
persons who have historically been subordinated because of their gender and
to encourage all persons to maximize the use of their particular talents and
to pursue their specific interests.' Persons are treated as individuals, are ac-
corded dignity and respect, and are permitted to meet their personal needs.
Because of the non-discrimination paradigm's emphasis on the "marketplace"
of desires and respect for individual differences, change is much slower than
in the quota-driven numerical parity paradigm.71
The differences in the two paradigms can be easily demonstrated by
using the fact situation in the athletic cases. The numerical parity paradigm
is best exemplified by Robertsn which arose out of the decision to curtail
the athletic program at Colorado State University (CSU) for the 1992-93 sea-
son73 In 1991-92, CSU offered eight men's sports and nine women's
sports.74 The percentage of intercollegiate athletes who were women was
approximately 35% and the percentage of students who were women was
approximately 48%.7 In order to balance the athletic budget and to increase
expenditures for scholarships in women's golf, tennis, and track, CSU dis-
continued the men's baseball program (fifty-five participants in 1991-92) and
the women's softball program (eighteen participants in 1991-92). However,
all athletic scholarships for the student-athletes in baseball and softball were
continued for 1992-93 even though the teams did not exist.
From a lay person's standpoint, the decision to eliminate baseball and
softball was not intentionally or unintentionally discriminatory toward wom-
en. Since one sport for each gender was eliminated and since women contin-
ued to have more sports than men (eight to seven), women were not singled
out for special treatment.76 Moreover, because there were three times as
69. Because young women and men are socialized differently, see studies cited supra note
68, it is not logical to assume that they must have identical interests. However, significant
questions remain about the manner in which such socialization occurs and the extent to
which it impedes growth and future flexibility in choosing future recreational activities, such
as athletics, or performing essential roles, such as child care. See Joannie M. Schrof, The Gen-
der Machine, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 2, 1993, at 10.
70. For example, adolescent women would be encouraged to pursue their interests in
math and science and their male counterparts would be supported in advancing their interests
in art, music, and childhood education.
71. Assuming that men and women have different desires, in some areas substantial
change may be impractical.
72. See supra notes 2, 5.
73. On June 1, 1992, after much internal discussion and several attempts to find alterna-
tive sources of funding, Dr. Albert Yates, President of CSU, accepted the athletic department's
recommendation for a reduction of the athletic program. See Brief of Colorado State Board of
Agriculture, supra note 2, at 9.
74. Roberts 1, 814 F. Supp 1507, 1514 (D. Colo. 1993).
75. Id. at 1512.
76. With the reinstatement of softball, Colorado State now has nine women's teams and
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many men on the baseball team as there were women on the softball team,
a disproportionate number of men, not women, were negatively impacted.
Furthermore, the net effect of the cuts was to increase the percentage of ath-
letes who were female from 35% to approximately 38%.
When thirteen of the softball players brought suit,' the district court
and court of appeals focused exclusively on the number of female athletes
participating in intercollegiate athletics.7' Throughout the litigation, CSU con-
tended that, if it was in violation of Title IX, it should, as a matter of aca-
demic autonomy, be given broad discretion to choose the means for correct-
ing the violation in light of its educational mission and budgetary resources.
For example, the violation could have been remedied by meeting the "safe
harbor" of "substantial proportionality" through some combination of rein-
stating softball, adding a women's sport other than softball, cutting a men's
sport, or by limiting male participation. The fact that Title IX could have
been satisfied by utilization of these three methods other than reinstatement
shows the transparency and weakness of the numerical parity paradigm
because if such action had been taken, the needs, wishes, interests and abili-
ties of the existing softball players would have not been met. Certainly, had
it anticipated how the courts were going to interpret Title IX, CSU could
have addressed its budget problem by following one or more of the forego-
ing non-reinstatement options, eliminated softball, met the "safe harbor" of
"substantial proportionality," and been invulnerable to litigation. The non-
discrimination paradigm would not have permitted such a result because it
would have focused on whether the actions of the institution in abolishing
the softball team resulted in unfair treatment of the individual players rather
than whether the participation rates of women in the athletic program gener-
ally mirrored their institutional enrollment.
Both tribunals in Roberts ignored club sports, intramural competitions,
and other aspects of the athletic program such as total expenditures,
equipment, locker rooms, travel, practice times, coaching, and access to med-
ical care.79 Both the district court and the court of appeals found that (1) a
"gap" of 10.5 percentage points between female enrollment and female par-
ticipation was not substantially proportionate," (2) the University had not
added women's teams"1 in recent years, 2 and (3) the presence of women
seven men's teams.
77. This suit was not a class action.
78. CSU presented evidence on club and intramural participation as well as other aspects
of its program.
79. These items are covered by the Athletic Regulations promulgated by the OCR, supra
note 2.
80. Roberts 1, 814 F. Supp 1507, 1513 (D. Colo. 1993) (referring to a gap of 10.6 percentage
points); Roberts II, 998 F.2d 824, 829 (10th Cir. 1993) (referring to a gap of 10.5 percentage
points).
81. CSU had added a number of women's teams during the 1970's, but had not added
any teams during the 1980's. It had also eliminated many more women's teams than men's
teams during both periods. Roberts 1, 814 F. Supp at 1514.
82. Even though the court in Roberts II noted that CSU had fashioned "a women's sports
program out of nothing in the 1970s," it chose to focus more on expansion in recent periods,
accepting the district court's finding that women's participation opportunities had declined
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who wished to play softball and who were capable of doing so meant that
all interests and abilities were not being accommodated.' Therefore, even
though no intentional discrimination was shown' CSU was found in viola-
tion of Title IX.' Accordingly, CSU was ordered to reinstate the softball
program.
Similarly in Brown86 and Favia" the courts focused exclusively on the
number of participants in intercollegiate athletics.' Concerns about the man-
ner in which individual members on women's teams were treated played no
role in the decisions whatsoever.89 Moreover, the role of club sports and
intramural competition, which involved far more women, was never given
due recognition by the courts in either case.' In sum, the only thing that
mattered was the number of female participants relative to the number of
male participants. Everything else was irrelevant.
In contrast, the decision in Colgate I" demonstrates the potential of the
non-discrimination paradigm to a large extent. In that decision, the district
court engaged in an extensive discussion of how (1) the men's hockey team
received fifty times the financial support of the women's team,' (2) the
men's team was provided with equipment while the women had to purchase
their own,93 (3) the men's locker room was 2,500 square feet and the wo-
men's locker room was only 225,"4 (4) the men's team traveled by chartered
buses while the women drove themselves,9' (5) the men's team had access
to the best practice times and would frequently bump the women out of a
practice slot,' (6) the men's team had professional coaches who were high-
steadily in the 1980s. Roberts II, 998 F.2d at 830.
83. Roberts 1, 814 F. Supp at 1517.
84. In Roberts I, the court expressly stated that Title IX and its implementing regulations
can be violated without a showing of specific intent to discriminate against women by the
decision makers for the educational institution, adding, "In other words, good intentions or a
misinterpretation of the law does not negate a violation of Title IX." Roberts 1, 814 F. Supp. at
1518. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed in Roberts II, holding that Title VII,
which does not require proof of intent, is "the most appropriate analogue when defining Title
IX's substantive standards, including the question of whether 'disparate impact' is sufficient to
establish discrimination under Title IX." Roberts II, 998 F.2d at 832.
85. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 4.
87. See supra note 6.
88. Brown involved issues regarding continuance of particular treatment of women's ath-
letics. However, Brown University and the Plaintiffs settled those issues prior to trial on the
merits.
89. It appears that the plaintiffs in these cases presented only limited, if any, evidence on
these factors. Although one may speculate as to why no evidence was presented, one reason
may have been that it is far easier to build a numerical case with statistics than a treatment
case with anecdotes. The latter requires far more discovery.
90. For a discussion of the inattention to intramural and club sports in terms of collection
of relevant data to determine participation opportunities by gender, see supra note 32.
91. See supra note 15.
92. Colgate 1, 802 F. Supp. 737, 744 (N.D.N.Y 1992).
93. Id.




STILL ON THE SIDELINES 19
ly paid while the women's coaches were volunteers who were paid a nomi-
nal stipend,' and (7) Colgate University had consistently denied the wo-
men's requests for varsity status.98 The University's alleged non-discrimi-
natory reasons for the lack of a sufficient number of women athletes, lack of
support by the NCAA, lack of close competition, and lack of student interest
were deemed insufficient grounds to justify the disparate treatment of
women.99 Essentially, the district court took the approach of comparing how
female hockey players were treated and how male hockey players were
treated and then ordered that the disparities in treatment be remedied. Inter-
estingly, the number of participants and the three-prong test were never
mentioned. In effect, Colgate I rejected the numerical parity paradigm in
favor of the non-discrimination paradigm."° Unfortunately, the appellate
court never had the opportunity to pass on the merits of the district court's
adoption of the non-discrimination paradigm.
These decisions demonstrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the
two paradigms. Both the numerical parity paradigm cases and Colgate re-
sulted in greater opportunities for women to participate in intercollegiate
sports. However, Colgate viewed access as only one dimension of the global
objectives of fair treatment and elimination of inequality, which are inherent parts
of the non-discrimination paradigm, as contrasted with the numerical parity
cases, which made proportional representation the focal point, ignoring its
relationship to the broader issue of treatment and satisfaction of the overall
needs of women athletes. Consequently, this issue was left to be addressed
in other settings. These differences in the conceptual approaches taken by
the courts under the respective paradigms may be attributable, at least in
part, to the fact that it is far easier to prove a disparity in numbers than it is
to prove a disparity in treatment, making the numerical parity paradigm a
more effective weapon for assuring equal access. However, the numerical
parity cases did little more than establish teams. They did not improve the
treatment of individual athletes or improve the environment under which
women athletes must practice and compete. In contrast, Colgate I provided
the desired opportunities to participate while addressing quality issues and
took steps to remedy disparities.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUDICIARY'S EMBRACE OF THE NUMERICAL
PARITY PARADIGM
As noted above, in every Title IX intercollegiate athletics case with the
exception of Colgate I, the federal judiciary has embraced the numerical pari-
ty paradigm. The implications of the federal judiciary's adoption of the nu-
merical parity paradigm for the intercollegiate athletic cases are quite
clear." 1 First, the opinions hold that a mere deficiency in the accommoda-
tion of interests, which is only one of the ten factors articulated in the Ath-
letic Regulations, is sufficient to find a violation of Title IX and, implicitly at
97. Id.
98. Id. at 745-46.
99. Id. at 745-49.
100. For a definition of numerical parity, see supra note 17.
101. See SQUIRE, SANDERS, & DEMPSEY, NCAA GUIDE TO TnTLE IX AND ATHLETICS 57 (2d ed.
1990).
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least, that strengths in other factors may not be used to contradict a weak-
ness in the accommodation of interests. This is directly contradictory to the
OCR's approach of examining all aspects of the athletic program and allow-
ing the strengths in one area to cancel out a weakness in another area' 2.
Moreover, the decisions establish that if any one of the three prongs is
met, there is no need to address the other prongs. Therefore, an institution
can have a female enrollment rate of fifty percent and a female participation
rate of twenty percent and still be in compliance, at least for the present
time, because it can demonstrate recent expansion or because all interests
and abilities are being accommodated. Ultimately, however, if an institution
is going to continue to meet the second part of the test, which requires
proof of a history and continuing practice of program expansion that is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interests and abilities of an un-
der-represented gender it will have to add a new women's sport periodically
in order to maintain its history of expansion. Therefore, the institution must
eventually achieve substantial proportionality. Similarly, if an institution
seeks to continue to meet the third prong of the test, it will have to con-
stantly be adding new sports as interest and ability develops. Consequently,
substantial proportionality has been transformed into a quota, something that
is expressly prohibited by the statute.0 3
Third, the decisions also make clear that the second prong is satisfied
only so long as a university is continually expanding athletic opportunities
in an ongoing effort to meet the needs of the under-represented gender and
persists in this approach as interest and ability levels in its student body and
secondary feeder schools rise. In other words, efforts that were made during
the 1970s or early 1980s are irrelevant. What matters is whether those efforts
have continued until the 1990s.'04
Moreover, improvements in the condition of women's sports, such as
better facilities or more scholarships, are equally meaningless. Since the typi-
cal university or high school added many sports in the 1970's and early
1980's and has not added any in recent years, it is logical to presume that
most institutions would fail the second prong as well. °" Even if an institu-
tion does have a history and continuing practice of program expansion, it
must continue to add women's sports in the future or run the risk that it
will no longer meet the requirements of the second prong. F o u r t h, the
decisions introduce a new and innovative standard for satisfaction of the
third prong. The Brown II court articulates the standard for the third prong
as follows. "If there is sufficient interest and ability among members of the
statistically underrepresented gender, not slaked by existing programs, an
102. See Mary W. Gray, The Concept of Substantial Proportionality in Title IX Athletics Cases, 3
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 165 (1996).
103. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
104. A total of 130 Members of Congress have urged that the second prong be clarified so
that compliance is achieved if one sport is added, on average, every three years. See Members
of Congress Seek New Policy Interpretation, NCAA NEWS (Overland Park, Kan.), July 19, 1995, at
2.
105. Ironically, if an institution did nothing in the 1970's and 1980's, but did add teams in
the 1990's, it would satisfy the prong.
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institution necessarily fails this prong ot the test." 6 In other words, if, at
present, there are students of an underrepresented gender who want to play
a sport and who have the ability to play that sport, the institution must
offer the sport regardless of the institution's ability to sustain a team in that
sport or the availability of competition. In contrast, the Policy Interpretation
explicitly provides that a team is required only when there is (1) interest, (2)
ability to play the sport, (3) a likelihood that the team can be sustained for a
number of years, and (4) a reasonable expectation of competition within the
institution's normal competitive region.0 7
While the differences between these two standards are subtle, they are
highly significant and very well could mean the difference between an insti-
tution having to add many sports and having to add no sports.' Further-
more, by ignoring intramural and club sport programs, the decisions contin-
ue the unfortunate emphasis on the 'small percentage of men and women
who are capable of competing in varsity athletics while completely ignoring
the overwhelming majority of students who are incapable of or unwilling to
play at the intercollegiate level."° Under the current Title IX approach, val-
uable monetary and human resources are being expended to ascertain the
gender rights of highly elite athletes with little regard for the gender rights
of the vast number of men and women whose physical attributes can best be
developed and enhanced through intramural and club sports, and even
"pick-up games.""' Except for the minuscule number of athletes who are
capable of playing intercollegiate sports, a vast number of young men and
women may never be afforded the valuable lifetime lessons that proponents
of sports emphatically exhort in their briefs on both sides in the Title IX
cases.
Fifth, the judicial adoption of the numerical parity paradigm may
prompt a comprehensive legislative revision of Title IX that effectively wipes
out the gains achieved through recent litigation."' Those who perceive
106. Brown II, 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993).
107. Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,417-18.
108. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
109. A large state university may have a student population in excess of 20,000. Yet, based
on data obtained from the NCAA as to national averages showing that only 6.3% of enrolled
students participate in intercollegiate athletics, memorandum from Todd Petr, Assistant Direc-
tor of Research of the NCAA, to Christine Susemihl, Director of Compliance, Athletic Depart-
ment, Colorado State University Uan. 30, 1995) (on file with Duke Journal of Gender Law &
Policy), only 1260 students would be involved in such institution's varsity sports programs,
leaving 18,740 students to seek other, often uncertain, avenues for pursuing their athletic in-
terests. Most men and women lack either the inherent ability and developed skills, or the
necessary interest to become involved in intercollegiate athletics.
110. Apparently, there have been no court cases or actions brought by the OCR focused
specifically on Title IX compliance in intramural or club sports. In view of the low percentage
of enrolled students who participate in intercollegiate athletics, a serious question arises as to
whether programs of educational institutions are in compliance with Title IX in intramural
and club sports or whether the right to equal opportunity of a large universe of students is
being ignored by advocates and governmental officials responsible for assuring equal opportu-
nity. For a discussion of inaction by the OCR in interscholastic sports, see infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
111. As with any revolution, there is resistance to the new way from those who perceive
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themselves as having the most to lose from the recent decisions emphasizing
numerical proportionality will resist the changes and attempt to counter
them. For example, the American Football Coaches Association is attempting
to persuade Congress" 2 to rewrite Title IX so that college football is ex-
empt from the numerical count.'13 If such efforts are successful,"4 it will
be relatively easy for institutions to achieve numerical parity without adding
sports for women, or slashing non-revenue sports for men."' Efforts to re-
vise Title IX may be further supported by the fact that male athletes in mi-
nor sports are beginning to protest and litigate the cuts to their programs
that have been made to achieve gender equity."6
themselves as having the most to lose.
112. Members of the Republican party are perhaps less protective of Title IX than their
counterparts in the Democratic party; however, the mere fact that both chambers of the Con-
gress are now controlled by the Republicans does not necessarily mean that there will be a
comprehensive roll-back of Title IX. Republicans have not yet made revision of Title IX a
major priority.
113. Football Coaches Take Aim at Title IX, USA TODAY (Arlington, Va.), Jan. 12, 1995, at 4C;
John Henderson, Title IX Battles Rage On: Football Bosses Go on Offensive, DENY. POST, Jan. 22,
1995, at B1; The Third Sex, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 6, 1995, at 15.
114. The authors do not believe that such efforts are necessary. There is no logical reason
to believe that college football would be less competitive with smaller squads. Indeed, the ex-
act opposite is true. If the major football powers could not carry a multiple number of former
high school superstars at every position, some of the current bench warmers at the major
powers would end up starting at the minor football powers. As a result, the minor powers
would have stronger teams and the major powers would have weaker teams. Thus, college
football would be more competitive.
What is needed is the uniform application of Title IX to all schools. At present, some
institutions are abiding by the rules, while others are not, as demonstrated by recent letters of
finding of the OCR and published reports. E.g., Letter of Finding from the OCR to Dr. John
D. Weity, President, California State University, Fresno (Apr. 6, 1994) (on file with the Duke
Journal of Gender Law & Policy); Carol Herwig, Federal Office Gets Tougher with Title IX, USA
TODAY (Arlington, Va.), July 21, 1994, at 7C.
115. For example, if a school has 100 males in football and 100 males in other sports, it
has 200 total male athletes. In order to achieve compliance, the school would have to sponsor
enough women's sports so that the school could allow 200 female athletes to participate. Yet,
if the 100 football players are exempt, the school need only sponsor enough sports to have
100 female athletes. Most institutions have already reached this level or close to it.
116. In two of the three suits filed, male athletes whose sports had been eliminated were
not successful in their efforts for reinstatement, primarily because their gender was not
underrepresented in athletics at their institutions. See Kelley, 832 F. Supp. 237, 241 (C.D. Ill.
1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Gonyo, 837 F. Supp
989, 996 (S.D. Iowa 1993). The third suit, Caruso v. Broyles, No. 93-5089 (W.D. Ark. filed
May 27, 1993), was settled. See VARYGAS, supra note 20, at 37; see also Debra E. Blum, Men
Turn to Federal Anti-Bias Laws to Protect Teams From Chopping Block, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc.
(Washington, D.C.), Aug. 11, 1993 at A33 (discussing Title IX cases brought by males and the
concept of proportionality as the benchmark of compliance). While these cases have been
unsuccessful thus far, there is always the possibility that courts will accept the theory that
Title IX does not sanction the cutting of a men's team in order to improve the percentage of
women participants.
In addition, the OCR has agreed to rethink how its enforcement efforts affect non-reve-
nue sports. See Mike Zapler, Protecting Men's Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D-
.C.), Jan. 6, 1995, at A43.
Moreover, an increased level of animosity between the genders may emerge. See United
Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A]n explicit policy
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Sixth, there is a great potential for resistance if recent intercollegiate
decisions are made applicable to secondary and primary school districts."'
Although the Title IX regulations concerning athletics clearly apply to inter-
scholastic sports programs," 8 gender participation in these programs is far
from substantially proportionate." 9 Yet, school districts,"20 which are fi-
nancially strapped nationwide, do not have the resources to increase par-
of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness.").
117. The athletic programs of elementary and secondary schools have been largely spared
in recent Title IX litigation, which has been primarily directed against institutions of higher
education. See cases cited supra notes 4-6.
However, at least some school districts realize that they may be subjected to litigation.
For example, the Birmingham Public Schools and the Alabama Association of School Boards
filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari following the decision in
Roberts II. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Birmingham Public Schools and the Alabama Asso-
ciation of School Boards in Support of the Petition for Certiorari, Colorado State Bd. of Agric.
v. Roberts, (No. 93-559), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
118. The Athletic Regulations clearly require that equal opportunity for both sexes be pro-
vided by any recipient of federal aid who "operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate,
club or intramural athletics." Athletic Regulations, supra note 2, § 106.41(c) (emphasis added); see
also VARGYAS, supra note 20, at 5 ("Many of the issues raised in connection with competitive
athletics are the same at both the secondary and post-secondary levels. For example, the
analysis of discrimination in the allocation of participation opportunities and the support and
treatment of student-athletes applies to all educational levels.").
The Investigator's Manual provides an additional basis for the OCR scrutiny of Title IX
compliance in elementary and high school athletic programs by stating that the Policy Inter-
pretation does not mandate the use in interscholastic programs of the overall approach ap-
plied in review of intercollegiate athletics. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 8. The
manual also notes that not more than nine of the thirteen "program components" set forth in
the Athletic Regulations are likely to occur in interscholastic programs and that complaints in
this area are likely to be more narrow in scope than those involving intercollegiate programs.
Id. Accordingly, although the Investigator's Manual devotes an entire section to interscholastic
compliance, it eschews overall evaluation of such programs for Title IX compliance and, in-
stead, calls for limitation of the OCR investigations only to those "program components"
which have been identified in specific complaints. Id. Such a policy seems myopic and ill-con-
ceived in view of the importance of achievement of gender equity in such programs, dis-
cussed infra notes 147-52. The mere lack of complaints, or the limited nature of those that are
received, appears to be a weak basis for constraining the investigatory role of the OCR with
respect to interscholastic programs. Compliance by such programs with Title IX is not only
intrinsically important, but also has a major impact on the ability of intercollegiate programs
to achieve the numerical parity currently demanded by the courts.
119. In the 1993-94 school year more than 3.4 million of the high school athletes were
male and 1.9 million were female (co-educational sports not included) even though the high
school enrollment of boys and girls is almost equal. See Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 14.
Further, since high schools provide the athletes for intercollegiate programs, parity in partici-
pation in interscholastic programs should provide a significant foundation for accelerated com-
pliance with gender equity on the intercollegiate level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the formation of attitudes about roles for males and females in athletics are formed in child-
hood long before entry into college. See generally supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text
(discussing the non-discrimination paradigm and its focus on equality of experiences in the
context of education).
120. The authors are not aware of a single federal program that provides financial assis-
tance to school districts for purposes of meeting their Title IX obligations in the context of
interscholastic athletics. Cf. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 594 n.9 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (observing that most college athletic departments do not receive federal funds).
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ticipation in women's sports.12 1 It seems unlikely that school districts will
cut educational programs in order to pay for more athletic opportunities for
a very small number of women."2 Rather, it seems far more likely that
school districts will simply cut back the male programs or get out of inter-
scholastic sports altogether.' 3
In criticizing the decisions in these cases for failing to address the non-
discrimination paradigm, we do not mean to criticize the ultimate re-
sults.124 Clearly, these decisions reaffirm a fundamental principle that each
gender is entitled to equal access to intercollegiate athletics. The reaffirma-
tion of this principle is a major victory for women in this and future gener-
ations."2 However, some extraordinarily important issues still exist, and
121. The financial problems faced by school districts are perhaps best illustrated by the
fact that there are state constitutional challenges to school finance systems in approximately
six states. This litigation, commonly called "school finance litigation," constitutes one of the
most significant trends in the law. For an examination of school finance litigation, see general-
ly William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
Massachusetts Decision As a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994); William E. Thro, The Third Wave:
The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance
Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990); Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State
Constitutional Provisions In Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639 (1989); see
also R. CRAIG WOOD, EDUCArION FINANCE LAW: CONSTITIMONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS--AN
ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES (1993) (discussing education finance distribution formulas and the histo-
ry of education finance litigation); JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1991) (describing his experiences teaching in and visiting schools in various neighbor-
hoods where de facto racial segregation still persists).
122. Although the number of women participating in interscholastic sports has risen dra-
matically, it still is only a small portion of the total number of women in school. According
to the National Federation of State High School Association's 1994 High School Athletics Par-
ticipation Survey, 2,124,755 females participated in high school athletics in the 1993-94 school
year. Aggregate enrollment of female students in high school for that period was 11,102,000.
123. In other words, the number of young men allowed to participate will decline. There-
fore, fewer young people will be able to learn the lessons which are inherent in high school
sports.
124. However, the authors do criticize the OCR for doing little or nothing to enforce these
results at other institutions of higher education. In effect, there appears to be a tilted playing
field in which those institutions which have been sued play under a different set of rules
than those which have not been sued.
125. Undoubtedly, the day will come when women intercollegiate athletes will play to
capacity crowds as frequently as men do. This is already occurring at the University of Colo-
rado where the women's basketball players outdraw their male counterparts. According to the
sports information office of the University's athletic department, after this institution made a
major commitment to building a championship women's basketball team, its average game
attendance, compared to the game attendance averages for the men's team, increased as fol-
lows:
University of Colorado Basketball Teams
Average Game Attendance





GAME NOTES (University of Colorado at Boulder Athletic Media Relations, Boulder, Colo.) Mar.
15, 17, 1995, Mar. 17, 1995.
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these issues are ignored by the numerical parity paradigm and its bureau-
cratic obsession with sheer numbers, which can be easily manipulated. 26
These issues are explored in the next section.
IV. THE NEED FOR A GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE NON-DISCRIMINATION
PARADIGM IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
Although the bolder elite women athletes have used the numerical pari-
ty paradigm to achieve greater numerical parity in intercollegiate athletic
programs, 27 scant judicial attention has been given to the non-discrimina-
tion paradigm - the equality of treatment afforded to intercollegiate athletes
in every "program component" designated by the OCR."2h
Exploration of issues of discriminatory treatment historically received by
women athletes on the intercollegiate level reveals a pattern of depreciating
In addition, all available tickets were sold for each of the two 1995 NCAA Regional
Tournament games played by the women's basketball team against Holy Cross and Southwest
Missouri State, on March 16th and March 18th, respectively, at the Coors Events Center on
the campus of the University of Colorado. Id.
126. To illustrate, an institution could simply cut men's teams as a means of achieving
substantial proportionality. Such a tactic would result in legal compliance, but would not do
anything for women.
Moreover, such a tactic implicitly assumes that it is acceptable to inhibit one gender in
the process of atoning for previous discrimination against the other gender. Such an assump-
tion would appear to be at odds with the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on race.
See cases cited supra note 23.
127. See cases cited supra notes 4-6.
128. For purposes of the analyses set forth in this Article, the term "equality of treatment,"
which refers to the standard of treatment required under the non-discrimination paradigm, see
supra notes 60-71, is broader than "accommodation of interests and abilities," 34 C.F.R. §
106.41(c)(1), as that phrase has been addressed judicially in terms of numerical parity. "Equali-
ty of treatment" does include the fair and equitable allocation of supportive resources to
women by their athletic programs.
In addition to the "accommodation of interests and abilities," the Athletic Regulations
designate nine basic areas in which supportive assistance to men and women must be equal
in effect. Athletic Regulations, supra note 2, § 106.41(c). These areas are:
(1) provision of equipment and supplies;
(2) scheduling of games and practice times;
(3) travel and per diem allowances;
(4) opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(5) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(6) provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(7) provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(8) provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(9) publicity.
Id.; Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415. These ten factors, together with athletic schol-
arships, 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c); support services (administrative, clerical, and secretarial assis-
tance), id. at 71,417; and recruitment of student athletes, Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at
71,417, form the 12 "program components" that, in addition to accommodation of interests
and abilities, are assessed by the OCR in determining whether athletic programs comply with
Title IX. Id. at 71,415-18. See Mary W. Gray, The Concept of Substantial Proportionality in Title
IX Athletics Cases, 3 DuKE J. GENDER L. PoL'Y 161 (1996). While these areas have ingredients of
the non-discrimination paradigm, they are applied by the OCR so mechanically and bureau-
cratically that their value is often lost. See infra note 146.
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the female gender, which may dampen future achievements of numerical
parity by educational institutions. So long as male athletes are deemed "prin-
ces" while women athletes are treated as "chimney sweeps,"'29 the major
intent and objectives of Title IX will never be met."30 In the past, women
athletes, their coaches, and the OCR have voiced strong concerns about the
neglect and inattention to the needs of such athletes by universities and
colleges in the face of the more favorable advantages given to men, 3' claim-
ing that women athletes are given fewer equipment resources,1'3 required
129. See Colgate I, 802 F. Supp. 737, 745 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), for application of this colorful
illustration to the difference in treatment of men and women ice hockey players.
130. Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) commented at the time of passage of Title IX that the
law was to be "a strong and comprehensive measure [that would] provide women with solid
legal protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving to perpetuate
second-class citizenship for American women." 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972); see also VARGYAS,
supra note 20, at 6 (discussing the legislative history of Title IX).
131. The women's basketball coach at the College of Mount St. Joseph filed suit in 1993,
in district court in Cincinnati, Ohio, claiming that she was demoted because she had com-
plained that men's sports were given a higher priority than women's sports. The suit also
alleged that the coach had been protesting since 1990 and had stated in 1991 that the discrep-
ancy between the men's and women's programs "reflects a lack of respect for women's ath-t
letics." College Coach Files Lawsuit, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, Nov. 26, 1993, at D5.
Similar litigation was also instituted by the former women's basketball coach at Baylor
University, accusing the institution of discrimination by allowing significant disparities be-
tween men's and women's sports in the area of compensation of head coaches. Bowers v.
Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp 142, 143 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
Furthermore, as discussed in several articles, legal actions based on disparities in pay
have been instituted by the women's golf coach at Oklahoma State University, the women's
basketball coach at Howard University, and the former women's gymnastics coach at the
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities (based upon comparisons with salaries of coaches of
men's football, basketball and ice hockey). See Carol Herwig, Equality of Salary Exception, Not
Rule, USA TODAY (Arlington, Va.), Jan. 25, 1994, at 8C; Ex-coach Files Suit, NCAA NEWS (Ov-
erland Park, Kan.), Oct. 18, 1993, at 3-11.
132. See B. Glenn George, Miles to Go and Promises to Keep: A Case Study of Title IX, 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 555, 562 (1993), which discloses that under the University of Colorado athletic
budget for the 1991-92 basketball season, the men's equipment budget was twice as large as
that provided for women. In presenting this and other disparities in resources given to the
men's and women's basketball team, the author says:
Yet in other areas, the male and female basketball players lead very different
lives, at least to the extent we measure those 'sports lives' by institutional expen-
ditures and support. Such differentiations damage the women's program both
explicitly and implicitly ... Implicitly, even when the discrepancies have no di-
rect effect on such tangible items such as uniforms and food, the distinctions in
the program convey a message about the importance of the women's program
and the students' contributions to this institution. When the women's basketball
coach earns a combined salary which is only thirty-eight percent of the combined
salary earned by the men's basketball coach, this must be widely understood as a
statement of priorities. Athletic department officials would no doubt protest such a
characterization, but this is indeed a circumstance in which 'money talks,' and the
message is loud and clear.
The University has since expanded its monetary commitment to women's basketball and its
coach and produced a championship team that outdraws its male counterparts. See supra note
125.
However, although this coach is now paid a salary that is equivalent to that of the
coach of the men's basketball team, the men's coach has the following additional incentives
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to ride in vans while men travel in buses (or ride in buses while men travel
by air)," forced by budgetary considerations to stay in lower quality lodg-
ing than men on road trips and to "scrimp" on meals," 4 subjected to inad-
equate responsiveness to their complaints of sexual harassment"3 provided
with coaches who are paid much less than their counterparts in charge of
men's teams,"' given fewer assistant coaches than are provided for men's
teams, accorded disparate recruiting resources,'37 granted fewer aids such
as clerical help, courtesy cars, and film equipment, provided with inferior
facilities, 3 ' are not accorded equivalent uniforms and shoes, 139 and
that are not paid to the women's coach: bonuses of $10,000 upon receiving a bid to the Na-
tional Invitational Tournament, $20,000 for winning the Big Eight championship, and $20,000
for being invited to the NCAA tournament with increments of $5,000 for each step to the Fi-
nal Four and $10,000 for reaching the title game. Colorado Coaches See Contrast in Contracts,
USA TODAY (Arlington, Va.), Mar. 23, 1995, at 2C.
133. See Colgate 1, 802 F. Supp. 737, 745 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
134. Id.; see also George, supra note 132, at 563 (citing the dramatic difference in the train-
ing table budgets for men's and women's teams).
135. For example, the OCR took Fresno State to task for its handling of a sexual harass-
ment complaint involving the allocation of practice time in its weight room. California State
Univ., Fresno, Title IX Compliance Review, STATEMENT OF FINDINGS (Office for Civil Rights, Dep't
of Educ.) Apr. 6, 1994, at 22-24; Carol Herwig, Federal Office Gets Tougher with Title IX, USA
TODAY (Arlington, Va.), July 21, 1994 at 7C (discussing statement of findings and letter); Letter
from John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, OCR, U.S. Department of Education, to Dr.
John D. Welty, President, California State University, Fresno 4 (Apr. 6, 1994) (on file with the Duke
Journal of Gender Law & Policy); see also MARIAH B. NELSON, THE STRONGER WOMEN GET, THE
MORE MEN LOVE FOOTBALL 66-69, 127-94 (1991) (regarding sexual harassment of women athletes
by spectators, male athletes, and coaches).
136. According to a survey by the Women's Basketball Coaches Association, the average
salary for coaches of women's teams at NCAA Division I institutions is $44,961 as compared
to $75,566 for coaches of men's teams. See Joseph P. Williams, Lower Pay for Women's Coaches:
Refuting Some Common Justifications, 21 J.C. & U.L. 643, 647 (1995); Women's Basketball Makes
Strides Everywhere, Except In Paychecks, ROCKY MTN. COLLEGIAN (Denver, Colo.), Mar. 31, 1994 at
1, 12; cf. Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, the court
denied a request for a preliminary injunction by the former coach of the women's basketball
team at the University of Southern California, seeking to continue her employment pending
the outcome of a suit for damages against the institution for alleged gender and salary dis-
crimination. The claim of discrimination was based on an alleged disparity in compensation of
$66,000 paid to the women's coach and $130,000 for the men's coach. The plaintiff was re-
placed when she refused to sign a new contract for $96,000. In assessing the likelihood of the
plaintiff prevailing on the merits, the court held that the women's coach failed to show that
her job-related responsibilities, particularly those related to promotion and public relations,
were equal to those of the coach of the men's basketball team in light of the much greater
revenues produced by the men's team and the job-related pressures and duties placed on its
coach to maintain such revenues.
See also George, supra note 132, at 564 (1993) (explaining that terms of employment con-
tract for coach of women's team were much less favorable than terms of contract for coach of
men's team).
137. See the description by the coach of the women's basketball team at the University of
Denver of the "fancy 'DU Basketball'" stationery provided to the men's basketball coach as
contrasted with the generic University paper given to her. Bill Briggs, DU Women's Coach a
'Miserly' Strategist, DENY. POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at 15A. The article containing this description
notes that the institution has increased its women's athletic budget by $200,000 for new
coaches, marketing, recruiting, and travel.
138. For example, during the 1980's one of the authors observed that the Hanover College
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bumped by men's teams from practice facilities."4 Although institutions
may have both men's and women's teams, it is clear that women athletes
have been subject to "separate and unequal" standards akin to those histori-
cally imposed in segregated public schools.'
Furthermore, although no reliable objective information is available, it
appears that a similar pattern has been pervasive in club, intramural,'
42
and interscholastic sports." For example, some state high school as-
sociations have declared that women's basketball will be played during non-
traditional seasons.'" The effect of such a position is to relegate young
women to second class status."3 The illustrations of demeaning and dispa-
rate treatment set forth above reflect a substantial area of unmet need for re-
spect, empowerment, acceptance, and recognition by women in intercollegiate
athletics. Such need is much broader than the "unmet need" reflected in the
lack of opportunity to participate in a particular sport, which is embodied in
the third prong of the three prong test. This issue of "unmet needs" in
terms of overall treatment of a particular gender is not addressed in Title IX
or the accompanying regulations except indirectly in terms of the "support
factors," which are generally subjected to a quantification test based on ob-
jective comparisons, such as equality in numbers of coaches, courtesy cars,
women's basketball team practiced and played its games on a floor which was shorter than
collegiate standards. In contrast, the men's team had a regulation floor.
139. George, supra note 132, at 563.
140. Colgate 1, 802 F. Supp. 737, 745 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
141. For a recitation of various examples of discriminatory treatment toward women partic-
ipating in athletic programs, see VARGYAS, supra note 20, at 8 n.20. See also Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that separate educational facilities for white and black
children are inherently unequal).
142. See supra notes 32, 110.
143. See VARGYAS, supra note 20, at 5.
144. See West Va. ex rel. Lambert v. West Va State Bd. of Educ., 447 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va.,
1994); see also Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994).
145. Controversy developed among basketball fans at Rocky Mountain High School in Fort
Collins, Colorado, because during the recent season the boys' and girls' teams played at about
the same time, but in different places. One female player said, "Everybody goes to the boys
games, and we don't have the advantage of seeing the guys play. People would come [in the
past] to the boys game at halftime of our games, and it was the only time we'd expect fans.
I hate it now." D. Bublitz, Attendance Falling Short at Girls Basketball Games, FORT COLLINS COLO-
RADOAN, Feb. 6, 1995, at Bi.
As another example, Indiana holds its women's high school basketball tournament in
February, leaving "March Madness" and "Hoosier Hysteria" to the young men. Telephone
Interview with Pat Roy, Assistant Commissioner, Indiana High School Athletics Association
(Mar. 24, 1996).
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dressing rooms, and shower heads."4
146. The Investigator's Manual contains 102 pages of ponderous instructions, admonitions,
and scripted questions, together with a 63 pages of appendices, for use by representatives of
the OCR in conducting investigations of intercollegiate athletic programs under Title IX. A
high degree of minutia and turgidity is reflected in the material. For example, one instruction
requires the investigator to categorize "equipment and supplies," which are to include, but
not be limited to "uniforms, other apparel, sport specific equipment and conditioning and
weight-training equipment." Moreover, the term "uniforms" is further delineated to include
"practice and game uniforms, shoes, rain gear, and warm-up suits," but the investigators are
cautioned "do not obtain, review or analyze information on undergarments, e.g., athletic sup-
porters, bras." INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 29. Nevertheless, the OCR investigators
have, on at least one occasion, ignored this admonition, and proceeded to count undergar-
ments. Letter from Estelle A. Fishbein, Vice President and General Counsel, Johns Hopkins
University, to Robert A. Smallwood, Regional Director of the OCR, at 2 (Feb. 14, 1995) (on
file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy) (stating that the OCR investigators spent 4.5
hours counting undergarments).
Indeed, personnel of institutions subjected to such mechanistic reviews encounter intense
frustration. In a letter to the Assistant Secretary and General Counsel of the OCR, counsel for
an institution that had been subject to such a review noted the following.
From the beginning, we were distressed that the OCR investigators showed that
they were unclear as to the proper focus of a Title IX investigation, and that they
lacked any in depth knowledge of collegiate sports in general and of specific
sports in particular. The questions asked often were ridiculous. Following are
examples:
OCR asked the crew coach, "Does the river need dredging?" The University,
of course, neither owns the "river" (actually the Baltimore harbor) nor has
control over the "river" bed, but in any event it is unclear to me what rele-
vance such a question has to a Title IX investigation!
After touring the facilities and being told that the University has only one
track, the OCR investigators asked the men's track coach, "Would you like to
have a track with more lanes?" the OCR's sole responsibility in the investiga-
tion at hand is to determine whether there is unequal treatment of men and
women in the University's sports program, and not to inquire into or com-
ment upon the adequacy of athletic facilities in general.
OCR investigators were told repeatedly that the meal money provided to the
player is the same for each sport. Nevertheless, the investigators repeatedly
asked, "Is the meal money enough?" the OCR's responsibility is to determine
whether there is equality of treatment of men and women in the athletic
program; and not to reach an opinion as to the sufficiency of meal money in
general.
The Sports Information Director explained extensively in two separate inter-
views that the role of his office is to provide sports information, and not
sports marketing. Nevertheless, the the OCR investigators asked the Sports
Information Director, "What publications do you publish to try to get public
interest?"
OCR investigators repeatedly asked coaches and team coaches, "Would more
publicity help?" It is unclear what purpose the investigator had in mind that
publicity would "help," but in any event the question has no relevance to
this Title IX investigation.
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V. DEVELOPMENT OF A HOLISTIC STANDARD FOR NON-DISCRIMINATION
UNDER TITLE IX - THE THEORY OF GENDER DEPRECIATION
The dominant focus in recent litigation on achievement of "substantial
proportionality" for measuring compliance with Title IX, 47 though symboli-
cally significant and increasingly meaningful in giving women greater access
to intercollegiate athletics, has limited value in redressing the secondary
status to which they and their sports have historically been relegated." s
Essentially, the current jurisprudence is focused on the number of women
participating while ignoring issues of discrimination. If such issues are to be
addressed, new methodologies of judicial analysis must be developed.
The Gender-Equity Report recently issued by a task force formed by the
NCAA 49 was unwilling to rest its definition of gender equity upon the
satisfaction of the requirements of the Athletic Regulations. Instead, it stated
that
[alt an institutional level gender equity describes an environment in which
fair and equitable distribution of overall athletics opportunities, benefits and
resources are available to women and men in which student-athletes, coaches
and athletic administrators are not subject to gender-based discrimination.
An athletics program can be considered gender equitable when the participants in
both the men's and women's sports programs would accept as fair and equitable the
overall program of the other gender. No individual should be discriminated against
on the basis of gender, institutionally or nationally, in intercollegiate athletics.'s
During the tour of the equipment room and obviously intent on finding any
discrepancy, if they could, between the equipment provided men and women
the OCR asked "Why are the women's basketballs smaller than the men's
basketballs?" Of course, the University equipment furnished women athletes is
in conformance with the NCAA rule. That rule setting the standard size of
basketballs for women is based on the fact that it is best suited to the small-
er size of women's hands.
OCR asked the men's tennis coach, "Does the University provide presses for
racquets?" The investigator appeared unacquainted with the fact that presses
were used only for wooden tennis racquets which have not been in use for at
least fifteen years, having been virtually completely supplanted by metal
racquets."
Letter from Estelle A. Fishbein, Vice President and General Counsel, Johns Hopkins Universi-
ty, to Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary, OCR, and Judith Winston, General Counsel, OCR, at
2-3, Dec. 8, 1994 (on file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy).
147. See cases cited supra notes 4-6.
148. See the examples of the subordinating and depreciating manner of treatment of
women athletes compared to that accorded their male counterparts, discussed supra notes
127-41 and accompanying text. In internal institutional proceedings and judicial decisions prior
to Brown I, equality in terms of absence of discrimination was given more attention than
parity. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Blair v. Wash-
ington State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379, 1380-81 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). See generally Edward
Branchfield & Melinda Grier, Aiken v. Lieuallen and Peterson v. Oregon State University:
Defining Equity in Athletics, 8 J.C. & U.L. 369 (1982).
149. Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 14.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
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The future enforcement efforts of the OCR in areas other than numerical
parity in participation may lead to the objectives identified in the Gender-
Equity Report. However, if the pattern of ineffectiveness demonstrated by
the OCR over the past twenty year continues,51 such expectations may
well be illusory. 2
Furthermore, even if the OCR should be inordinately successful in caus-
ing institutions to comply with all program components in the Athletic Reg-
ulations, including support services,5 3 which are "equal in effect,""5 '
women athletes may continue to be perceived as lacking honor, absent reme-
dies to assure that they are afforded an environment in which their status as
athletes will be respected, and which will ensure that they are not subject to
subordination, exploitation, or denigration. A more appropriate remedy will
enable women athletes to assert that the atmosphere in which they perform
will not (1) be perceived by a reasonable person as hostile or abusive, (2)
expose them to disadvantageous terms and conditions vis-i-vis their male
counterparts in preparing for and engaging in athletic competition, or (3)
alter their practice and playing environment so as to make it more difficult
for them to perform as athletes.1 5 These factors, which are equivalent to
those used in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.15 6 for defining the components
of the "hostile environment" predicate for claims of sexual harassment in
employer/employee contexts under Title VII, should provide the foundation,
for determining whether gender depreciation exists in relationships between
institutions and their students. However, the standard of gender depreciation
would not require the factual setting of sexual misconduct or impropriety
that has been an implicit prerequisite in most judicial interpretations involv-
ing sexual harassment. 57 It would broadly reflect the non-discrimination
paradigm by focusing upon whether an institution's actions or inactions with
respect to its male or female athletes are based upon a gender animus that
impairs persons of either gender from demonstrating and performing their
151. For a description of the statements attributed to various persons involved in Title IX
litigation on behalf of plaintiffs and the discussion of neglect in enforcement by the OCR, see
the Lyndon B. Johnson School report, supra note 2.
152. Criticism of the OCR's enforcement efforts is not limited to the athletics context. In-
deed, The Denver Post observed that the recent record of the OCR "provides one of the best
arguments yet for scaling back the budget of this federal agency, if not eliminating it alto-
gether." Editorial, Office of Civil Rights Produces a Meager Harvest, DENY. POST, July 20, 1995, at
B10.
153. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 2.
154. Id.
155. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993). In determining whether
a "hostile environment" based on gender existed, some pre-Harris cases applied a standard
based on the perceptions of a "reasonable woman." See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879
(9th Cir. 1991); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp 204, 218 (E.D. Va. 1988). However,
Harris itself applied a "reasonable person" test. Nevertheless, some post-Harris cases are con-
tinuing to apply a standard that makes reference to gender-related perceptions. See Spain v.
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th
Cir. 1994).
156. Harris, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71.
157. See cases cited supra note 155.
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athletic skills to the best of their abilities. This is the holistic and subjective
underpinning for application of the principle of the gender depreciation, which
if not avoided, would give rise to the injunctive relief and recovery of dam-
ages by injured parties. Such a standard could be incorporated into Title IX
by judicial interpretation, administrative regulation, or amendment of the
statute. A major advantage of the employment of this standard would be to
avoid the transparency of. current judicial tests embodying the numerical
parity paradigm, such as "substantial proportionality,"" 8 which focuses
solely on numbers of participants by gender in an intercollegiate athletic
program, but gives scant attention to whether such participation is meaning-
ful. For example, an institution with impure motives can easily achieve com-
pliance with Title IX by attaining substantial proportionality through the
establishment of some women's intercollegiate teams solely because they
inherently require or permit large numbers of participants, such as crew in
the arid West or ice hockey in the South, which may neither be competi-
tive' 9 nor meet the needs of its women students.
An administrative foundation for this proposition exists in at least two
key provisions of the overall regulations of the OCR governing compliance
with Title IX by athletic programs receiving Federal funds.16° First, the Ath-
letic Regulations, besides containing the "three-pronged test," which empha-
sizes numerical parity in participation and has been the centerpiece for re-
cent decisions in Title IX cases in intercollegiate athletics, 6' also include a
provision that "[no person shall on the basis of sex . . . be denied the bene-
fits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be discrimi-
nated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athlet-
ics offered by a recipient [of federal aid] .... 62 Secondly, another provi-
sion of the Master Regulations,"6 which relates to educational programs
and activities'" (the Activity Regulation), prohibits a recipient of federal
aid from engaging in specific discriminatory acts on the basis of gender in
158. It must be emphasized that only one of the prongs in the three-pronged test must be
satisfied. As discussed in the text accompanied by notes 101-02, supra, the only "safe harbor"
among these tests is "substantial proportionality."
159. In Roberts II, the court reversed a portion of the district court's directives to Colorado
State, emphasizing that
Nothing in Title IX requires an institution to create a "top flight" varsity
team ... nor is it within the district court's power, once [the institution] rein-
states the softball program with all the incidental benefits of varsity status, "to
make sure that they have a good season."
Roberts II, 998 F.2d 824, 835 (10th Cir. 1993).
160. 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1995) [hereinafter Master Regulations].
161. See cases cited supra note 11.
162. See Athletic Regulations, supra note 2, § 106.41(a)-(c); see also discussion supra note 128
(discussing ten areas where the Athletic Regulations require equality in effect).
163. See supra note 160.
164. Section 106.31 of the Master Regulations covers discrimination based on sex in any
academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or other education program or activi-
ty. Even though the Athletic Regulations specifically cover gender discrimination in physical
education or athletic programs, given the breadth of the language of § 106.31 and the lack of
any reference to exclusivity of the Athletic Regulations in covering students in intercollegiate
athletic programs, no sound basis exists for not applying the said Section to such programs.
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providing any "aid, benefit, or service" (Assistance) to a student. Among the
particular acts that are forbidden are treating one person differently from
another in determining whether such person satisfies any requirement or
condition for Assistance, subjecting any person to separate or different rules
of behavior or other treatment, and otherwise limiting any person in the en-
joyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity.'"
Application of such standards to the treatment of athletes in intercolle-
giate athletics leads to a new legal theory of gender depreciation, which is a
derivative form of sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination. Under
the theory of gender depreciation, courts would be forced to examine the en-
tire environment surrounding intercollegiate athletics, and institutions would
be forced to explain every instance when men and women were treated
differently. Such things as different modes of transportation, different lodg-
ing arrangements, and requirements that one gender take inferior practice
times or use inferior facilities and/or equipment would not be tolerated.'6
However, such things as differences in equipment expenditures 167 or in
overall participation levels might be tolerated."6 The critical requirement
would be that all athletes would be treated the same regardless of gen-
der.169
Judicial support for this theory of gender depreciation may be found in
recent cases sanctioning the application of traditional concepts of Title VII to
claims for private damages for discriminatory treatment under Title IX. 7
165. Arguably, an important determinant of whether an athletic program is engaged in
gender discrimination or harassment would rest on an examination of whether it, through the
behavior of its coaches and administrators, can reasonably be perceived to give one gender
greater opportunities than the other in the development of individual athletic potential; the
likelihood of having winning or championship teams; the production of revenue for gender-
related sports; engagement in efforts to inculcate greater character, confidence, and self-esteem
in players; and the establishment of foundations for earning respect and recognition from
others. Such criteria transcend the rigid and mechanical tests applied relative to "program
components" in the Athletic Regulations and permit a more holistic and subjective assessment
of whether gender depreciation exists in an athletic program. It is also consistent with the
"your program, my program" definition of gender-equity in the Task Force Report. See supra
note 2.
166. As observed supra notes 127-44 and accompanying text, there are numerous examples
of unequal treatment in women's sports.
167. Obviously, it costs more to outfit a female lacrosse player than a male diver. Thus,
there would be a valid reason for spending more on equipment for the women's lacrosse
team than for the male swimming and diving team.
168. For example, even though a school offers more sports for women than for men, it
still might have more male participants. This is particularly true if one of the male sports is
football. Under the numerical paradigm, this is unacceptable.
However, some schools field female volleyball and swimming teams, but do not field
male teams in these sports. This is unacceptable under the non-discrimination paradigm.
169. It is possible that a school could "tier" its sports and give preferential treatment to
certain teams (i.e. men's basketball and football). However, if a school did this, it would be
obligated to give preferential treatment to some women's teams as well.
170. Although gender discrimination has historically been addressed under Title VII, sever-
al courts have recently declared that the substantive standards under this provision as to
hostile environments involving sex or gender also apply to Title IX. See, e.g., Roberts II, 998
F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that despite the fact that Title IX was explicitly mod-
eled onTitle VI, Title VII is "the most appropriate analogue when defining Title DC's substan-
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Persuasive analogies involving indifference to or acquiescence in disparate
and demeaning treatment of women by athletic departments 7" can be
made circumstances leading to judicially determined violations of Title
tive standards, including the question of whether 'disparate impact' is sufficient to establish
discrimination under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964") (quoting Mabry v. State Bd. of
Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 849 (1987)) ; Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896-97 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that where student-employee claimed dismissal from residency program was due to sexual
harassment, disparate treatment standard of Title VII applied to claims under Title IX); Ward
v. John Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 375 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that Title IX claims by a
female employee and a student-employee of the University that a male employee sexually
harassed them was "appropriately analyzed under the standards applicable to cases brought
under Title VII"); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1291-93 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (permitting plaintiffs to state a claim under Title IX for hostile environment based
on continued presence of teacher who allegedly sexually abused students); Hastings v. Han-
cock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Kan. 1993) (denying summary judgment on grounds that
Title VII "agency" principles may be applied under Title IX to impose liability upon private,
unincorporated institution for alleged sexual harassment of student by employee); see also SEX
DISCRIMINATION HANDBOOK, (Barbara S. Gamble ed.) (1992); cf. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (holding that Title IX must be given "'a sweep as broad as its
language'" and thus include employment discrimination within its prohibition) (citation omit-
ted); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp 1560, 1571 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (allowing plain-
tiffs to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX for alleged
student-to-student harassment, but dismissing action, with leave to amend, based upon plain-
tiffs' failure to allege the requisite level of intent). Other cases have applied precedents under
Title VI in addressing claims under Title IX. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 696-98, 702-03 (1978). A few cases have assumed that Title IX applies to hostile environ-
ment claims without reference to other statutory mandates. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992); Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex.
1994). But see Brougher v University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77-78 (3rd Cir. 1989) (af-
firming dismissal of action based on statute of limitations and declining consideration of dis-
trict court's conclusion that Title IX does not permit recognition of claims based on sexually
hostile environment). In addition, a more recent district court opinion refused to apply Title
IX under a hostile environment assertion where male student was taped to a towel rack by
other members of football team, noting that:
Title IX was not intended to create a genderless society in which every act gives
rise to a cause of action simply because it affects a male or a female. The reme-
dies under Title IX may tempt creative lawyers to carry the causal link between
gender and gender discrimination further than Congress intended.
Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1116, 1118-19 (D. Utah 1994).
171. See supra notes 127-44 accompanying text.
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IX i Theoretically, in view of the broad language used by courts in sever-
172. See Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1228 (9th Cir. 1994) (determining the educational
rights under Title IX for women in prisons); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of
Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1979) (discussing the disparity in required workplace
attire); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1978) (dis-
cussing the disparity in quality and privacy of office facilities); Bowers, 862 F. Supp at 143
(discussing the disparate allocation of resources to women's basketball program and unequal
terms of employment); Fisher v. Vassar College, 852 F. Supp. 1193, 1225-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(discussing the denial of tenure, based on "sex-plus" standard applied to married women
with family responsibilities).
Furthermore, judicial decisions have imposed upon colleges and universitites specific
duties of protection over their students, which may also, by analogy, be used to buttress
claims of gender depreciation. See Furek v. University of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 522 (Del. 1991);
Mullins v. Pine Manor College, N.E.2d 331, 337 (Mass. 1983); NELSON, supra note 2, at 160
("The coach and the athlete may spend thirty hours a week together. That's more time than
an adolescent will spend with any teacher, friend, or, usually, parent."); RICK TELANDER, THE
HUNDRED YARD LiE: THE CORRuFnON OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN Do To STOP IT 100
(1989):
So much of what coaches do to their players is done in the name of "discipline,"
as though the pursuit of that virtue justifies almost anything. "You gotta have
discipline to play this game," the coaches say over and over. And it is true that
discipline - the control of one's behavior to facilitate efficiency - is important
for success in football, but no more so than it is in almost every other endeavor.
Any yet this vague thing, "discipline," hangs over every football field, sought
after like the Grail, but always slipping through the fingers, just out of reach.
And that is because what coaches really want is not discipline but subservience.
Much confusion and uncertainty exists as to whether and to what extent reference can or
must be made to other federal statutes, particularly Titles VI and VII, in the substantive inter-
pretation of Title IX. The Supreme Court has stated only that Title IX is "patterned after"
Title VI, without making clear whether this means that the interpretation of the former must
necessary follow that of the latter. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 684 (1979).
Furthermore, documented legislative history of Title IX is both scarce and flimsy. As the
Brown II court stated, "part of the confusion about the scope of Title IX's coverage and the
acceptable avenues of compliance arose from the absence of secondary legislative materials.
Congress included no committee report with the final bill and there were apparently only
two mentions of intercollegiate athletics during the Congressional debate." Brown II, 991 F.2d
888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993). Moreover, the genesis of Title IX continues to be unearthed. See Brief
For Amici Curiae American Council on Education, Association of American Universities, Na-
tional Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, and National Association of State
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, at 13, Brown University v. Cohen (Brown IV) (1st Cir.
filed June 26, 1995) (No. 95-1417), which includes a new revelation from the legislative histo-
ry of Title IX showing that Title VII was the basis for the express disclaimer in Title IX that
preferential or disparate treatment of one gender was not to be required because of imbalanc-
es involving participation of the other gender. See 117 Cong. Rec. 39,261-39,262 (1971).
Moreover, the opinions in Roberts II and Brown II reflect divided views of the Tenth
and First Circuits as to whether Title VII, as construed in judicial and administrative prece-
dents, is a valid referent for interpretation of Title IX. In the former decision, despite its ex-
press recognition that Title IX was explicitly modeled on Title VI, the Court declared that
Title VII is "the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards,
including the question of when 'disparate impact' is sufficient to establish discrimination un-
der Title IX." Roberts II, 988 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Mabry v. State Bd. of
Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 849 (1987); cf. Colgate I, 802 F. Supp 737, 743 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the Title VII
"disparate impact" standard in a Title IX case in which members of a women's intercollegiate
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al recent Title VII cases construing sexual harassment," such athletes may
athletic team alleged that they were the subject of gender discrimination under Title IX).
Contrary to the position of the Tenth Circuit in Roberts II and the other decisions refer-
enced above, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that "excepting perhaps in
the employment discrimination context, see Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st
Cir. 1988) (applying Title VII standards in Title IX case, but explicitly limiting the crossover
to the employment context), the Title VII burden-of-proof rules do not apply in Title IX cas-
es." Brown II, 991 F.2d 888, 902 (1st Cir. 1993).
Such a view was magnified by the district court in Brown III in its decision on the
merits following its receipt of the remanded case. In referring to the proper interpretation of
Title IX, the court stated flatly that
[clomparison of Title VII is inapposite, however. Title VII seeks to determine
whether gender-neutral job openings have been filled without regard to gender.
Title IX, on the other hand, was designed to address the reality that sports
teams, unlike the vast majority of jobs, do have official gender requirements, and
this statute accordingly approaches the concept of discrimination differently from
Title VII.
Brown 11, 879 F. Supp. 185, 205 (D.R.I. 1995). The indifference of the court to the broader ob-jectives of Title IX with respect to areas of discrimination other than sports teams, see Brown
II, 991 F.2d at 894, and its assumption that such teams must necessarily have gender require-
ments is at least puzzling, and at most, disturbing.
The sharp contrast reflected in the respective views of the courts for the First and
Tenth Circuits as to the precedential value of Title VII for interpretation and dissection of
Title IX graphically illustrates the schism between the numerical paradigm espoused by Brown
11 and III, and the non-discrimination paradigm that is inherent in the Title VII burden-shift-
ing standard accepted by the court in Roberts II, but which was lost in the morass of the
court's application of the "three-pronged test." See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
If the courts in Brown or Roberts had applied the widely-interpreted "McDonnell-
Burdine" burden-shifting standard used in Colgate, see supra note 16, instead of being captivat-
ed by the fixed participation formulae embodied in the three-pronged test, which is rooted
solely in a policy determination of the OCR, a more flexible and meaningful basis for address-
ing questions of gender discrimination could have been established. Instead of focusing solely
on numbers of players of a particular gender and application of a series of mechanistic tests
as to the support services provided to them, the courts in Brown and Roberts could have
creatively applied the burden-shifting standard in a manner consistent with the non-discrimi-
nation paradigm, which would have required gender neutrality in the overall administration
of an athletic program and its treatment of student athletes.
Such approach might be illustrated by an analogy to the biblical story of Noah. Even
assuming that Noah followed his mandate to "bring every sort into the ark, to keep them
alive with you . . . [and] they shall be male and female," Genesis 6:19 (Revised Standard
Version), and had housed them in quarters of equal dimensions and given them equal por-
tions of food while waiting for the waters to subside, would this have been enough to es-
tablish a "safe harbor," evidencing the absence of discrimination by Noah against each whojourneyed with him? Would not a better test permit those who made the voyage to show
that Noah took along some who had little chance of survival simply to satisfy his "participa-
tion" directive; to show that Noah had begrudgingly parceled out the equal amounts of food
to some, but had enthusiastically given it to others; and to prove that they reasonably per-
ceived that Noah imposed demands on them that he did not impose on certain "favored"
species, which impaired their ability to perform their daily assignments on their ark? More-
over, in fairness to Noah, should he not then be permitted to come forward and show appro-
priate justifications for the actions that allegedly formed the basis for such charges?
Finally, it bears noting that the relationships between students and their coaches are of-
ten much stronger and more intense than other student/teacher relationships. See NELSON,
supra note 2, at 160-62 (1991).
173. One such broad pronouncement discussed the role of sexual behavior in a Title VII
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even be able to recover damages for gender depreciation even though little or
action:
We have never held that sexual harassment or other unequal treatment of an
employee or group of employees that occurs because of the sex of the employee
must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other
incidents with clearly sexual overtones. And we decline to do so now. Rather, we
hold that any harassment or unequal treatment of an employee or group of em-
ployees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may,
if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment.
McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A more recent case further developed
the hostile environment predicate for a Title VII claim, holding:
The predicate acts which support a hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim
need not be explicitly sexual in nature . . . . Rather, the key issue "is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed .... " Hostile-envi-
ronment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, when it is sufficiently
patterned or pervasive.
Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed the implications of Title VII for women in
the workplace and the legislative intent behind Title VII:
Congress expected that Title VII would result in the "removal of artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidi-
ously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifica-
tion .... " Such an objective can only be achieved if women are allowed to work
without being harassed. Women who know that they will be subject to harass-
ment will be deterred from joining the work force or accepting certain jobs. The
objective standard protects the employer from the "hypersensitive" employee, but
still serves the goal of equal opportunity by removing the walls of discrimination
that deprive women of self-respecting employment .... To constitute impermissi-
ble discrimination, the offensive conduct is not necessarily required to, include sex-
ual overtones in every instance or that each incident be sufficiently severe to
detrimentally affect a female employee. "Intimidation and hostility toward women
because they are women can obviously result from conduct other than sexual
advances."
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483-85 (3rd Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see
also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993); Chambers v. American Trans Air,
Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1005 (7th Cir. 1994) (dictum). In Harris, the Court did not emphasize sexual-
ity in its discussion of a hostile workplace, but instead focused on "hostile and abusive" con-
duct, stating "the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created
a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion or national origin
offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality." Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371 (emphasis added).
The Court also stated, "[slo long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, as hostile
or abusive . . . there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious." Id. (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Justice Scalia states, "[t]oday's opinion elaborates that
the challenged conduct must be severe or pervasive enough 'to create an objective hostile or
abusive work environment . . . that a reasonable person would find hostile and abusive.'" Id. at
372 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court explained that the
determination of whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" is to be made by looking
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no sexual misconduct has been directed against them. 74 The Equal Protec-
at all of the circumstances and relevant factors, including "the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employees' work performance." Id. at 371
(emphasis added).
174. The legal principle of "hostile environment" in sexual harassment has been interpreted
extensively under the prohibitions of Titles VII and IX. Cases under Title VII include Harris,
114 S. Ct. 367; Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vincent, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Carr v. General Motors
Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994); Kopp, 13 F.3d 264; Andrews, 895 F.2d 1469; Hicks v. Gates
Rubbe r Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney, 765 F.2d 1129. For cases under Title IX,
see Franklin, 112 S. Ct. 1028; Lipsett, 864 F.2d 881; Ward, 861 F. Supp. 367; Slaughter v. Waub-
onsee Community College, No. 94-C2525, 1994 WL 663596 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1994); Floyd v.
Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993); Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. 1280.
Moreover, the definition of sexual harassment under Title IX by reference to holdings
under Title VII can be broadened to include nonsexual discrimination based on gender ani-
mus. For discussion of inclusion of substantive standards of Title VII in Title IX, see supra
note 172. Although several courts have found violations of Title IX in sexual discrimination
contexts, no cases have been located that impose liability under Title IX for sexual harassment
where no allegations of sexual misconduct have been asserted. However, the broad language
in Title VII cases and in some recent Title IX decisions suggest that such decisions under
such provision may be forthcoming. See, e.g., Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 715-16 (2d
Cir. 1994) (holding that a student established a claim under Title IX that college discriminated
against him because of his gender based on an allegation that he was erroneously found to
have harassed his roommate's girlfriend); cf. Accardi v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. App. 4th 341,
345 (1993) ("Sexual harassment does not necessarily involve sexual conduct. It need not have
anything to do with lewd acts, double entendres or sexual advances. Sexual harassment may
involve conduct, whether blatant or subtle, that discriminates against a person solely because
of that person's sex."). The court went on to find a basis for sexual harassment under a Cali-
fornia law similar to Title VII, where petitioner, a female police officer, claimed that following
an injury she was excluded from light duty assignments afforded male officers and subjected
to the. filing of false medical reports claiming she was no longer disabled. The court empha-
sized that the period in which such alleged actions occurred could not be separated from a
"decade-long campaign against her" by a police department, founded upon the department's
unwritten policy that law enforcement had traditionally been a man's job and "hence, no
women need apply." Id. at 350.
The practical effects of the EEOC guidelines have been unfortunate, as courts have shift-
ed the focus of sexual harassment inquiry away from gender and toward sexual conduct as a
predicate for a valid claim:
Notwithstanding that the essence ofsexual harassment is gender discrimination, the
EEOC Guidelines focused on sexuality rather than gender. The EEOC defined
sexual harassment as job detriments resulting from [uinwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture. In so doing, the EEOC inadvertently misled some courts into supposing that
sex-based harassment must necessarily involve sexual conduct. Hostile environment
cases are really much simpler. They present situations that, like quid pro quo
cases, involve disparate treatment based on an employee's gender. In one common
situation, women employees, often in occupations or workplaces traditionally dom-
inated by men, are subjected to hazing behaviors: scorn, ridicule, and verbal abuse
from males who resent their presence. The behavior consists of gestures, words,
or conduct that may or may not be sexual in content. The sexual content of the
conduct may suffice, but it is never necessary, to prove that the conduct is based
on sex. Cases involving analogous harassment of racial and ethnic minorities are
directly relevant, and establish that harassment on the basis of sex, even if not
sexual in content, violates Title VII.
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tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 75 also provides judicial support
for the right of participants in athletic programs to receive comparable treat-
ment as reflected in the Harris standard, and to seek damages under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871176 for gender depreciation.' Although females and
males on the pre-college level have generally been successful in asserting
their rights under the Equal Protection Clause to participate on teams of the
opposite gender, 7 ' administrators, regulatory bodies, and conferences in-
volved with intercollegiate athletic programs have universally accepted gen-
der differences in athletic competition" by creating separate programs and
BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 30 (1992)
(footnotes omitted). But see Seamons, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1117-19 (D. Utah 1994) (dismissing
student's claim that alleged locker room hazing incident violated Title IX, because of insuffi-
cient proof of an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex); Herman v: Western Fin. Corp.,
869 P.2d 696, 703 (Kan. 1994) (finding alleged sexual relationship of plaintiff's supervisor with
another employee insufficient to support hostile work environment sexual harassment claim).
For examples of similar judicial restraint in Title VII cases with respect to the sufficien-
cy of claims to establish gender harassment, see DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers
Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding anonymous comments in newsletter directed to-
ward female police officer and female officers in general not so frequent, pervasive, or point-
edly insulting as to create hostile working environment).
175. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. For the text of this provision, see supra note 38.
176. 40 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
177. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the disparate treatment stan-
dard of Title VII applies as well to claims arising under the Equal Protection Clause and Title
IX).
178. It is not clear whether a commission would have authority to adopt a sex rule for
participation in physical activity. If such a rule could be adopted:
[Tihe second, and perhaps more difficult question would be whether such a rule
was reasonable. In the area of sex-based classifications, the reasonableness issue
will normally be raised in terms of the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In considering the permissibility of [rules
requiring separate participation by gender], it was observed that the courts have
generally given little determinative weight to the use of presumptions about the
presumed lack of physical ability of females as a class.. Accordingly, it was sug-
gested that sex rules would be upheld only where the rule-maker could demon-
strate a reasonable factual basis for the reasons offered to justify the use of sex-
based classifications.
JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 2.10, at 147-48 (1979); see also
Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding rule prohibit-
ing girls from participating on boys' tennis, cross-country, and running teams is subject to
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169-70
(D. Colo. 1977) (applying balancing test based on importance of the opportunity denied,
strength of the state interest involved, and character of the group seeking participation rights
through class action, and holding that rule prohibiting female participation violated the Equal
Protection Clause). Part of the rationale for these decisions may be based on the fact that no
separate teams existed for the girls who sought rights to participate on boys' teams. Courts
have not been sympathetic to assertions of rights of boys to play on girls' teams where male
teams already existed. See Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 255-56 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 864-65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979);
see also ANNIE CLEMENT, LAW IN SPORT AND PHYSICAL AcTivrrY 136-142 (1988).
179. Such differences are likely to be attributed simplistically to variance in physical char-
acters, such as absolute size or strength, particularly with respect to "contact sports." Howev-
er, a more informed and sophisticated analysis of such issue requires evaluation of factors
such as inculcation of athletic skills and developmental patterns in childhood and unfounded
40 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & PoLIcY
teams for men and women."s If this formal separation is broadly chal-
lenged in intercollegiate athletics, courts may be required to review the legal
acceptability in a gender context of the doctrine of "separate, but equal,"18'
most prominently associated with racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson, s2
which was later repudiated by Brown v. Board of Education."s The issue has
not been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.1M
stereotypes of differentiation based on cultural perceptions. See NELSON, supra note 2, at 45,
60-63.
180. The rules of the NCAA specifically require minimum numbers of teams for men and
women. The number of men's teams may include "mixed teams." A "mixed team" is one on
which at least one person of the opposite gender participates. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS'N, 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL §§ 20.9.3, 20.9.6. However, no "mixed team" standard is in-
cluded in determining women's teams. This means that if a male participates on a women's
team, such team must be counted as a men's team. However, if a woman participates on a
men's team, the converse does not follow in that the team remains as a men's team, since
only men's teams may be "mixed." Such rules lead to the perplexing question of whether the
involvement of a number of men on women's teams, particularly if no comparable teams
existed for their gender, would convert the women's teams to men's teams, causing an insti-
tution to fall below its necessary complement of women's teams. Despite adherence to sepa-
rate gender competition by the NCAA, some college athletes have sought the right to com-
pete on the same teams with members of the opposite gender. See, e.g., Leffel v. Wisconsin
'Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1119 (E.D. Wisc. 1978).
181. The argument for separation of one gender from competition by the other gender has
often been based on biological differences with assertions that males are larger, stronger, and
faster than women in absolute terms. This argument assumes that current forms of athletic
competition, which are largely male-based in origin and development, must necessarily be
maintained, and ignores findings that in contextual terms (such as discounting difference in
size in making comparisons of performance), the physical capability of females appears to be
equal or greater than that of men. See, e.g., Jackie L. Hudson, It's Mostly a Matter of Metric, in
WOMEN AND SPORT 147, 159 (D. Margaret Costa & Sharon R. Guthrie eds., 1994); NELSON, supra
note 2, at 52-57 (1991). However, even if separation is deemed reasonable and is predicated
upon a rational basis, the extension of this argument to maintain that lesser facilities, services,
or treatment can lawfully be accorded to women is without merit.
182. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
183. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
184. The most recent opportunity for the Court to decide the issue of "separate, but equal"
in a gender setting occurred in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982),
but the Court instead viewed the case as one involving a state having only one single-sex
educational institution. Id. at 720 n.1. Hogan involved a suit under the Equal Protection Clause
for injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages, by a male who had been
denied admission to a nursing school that admitted only females. The Court held for the
plaintiff, stating that the state had failed to carry its burden of showing "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" for its classification based on gender. Id. at 724. The Court declared that if
a state's objective is to "exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are pre-
sumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate." Id. at 725. The Court also rejected the use of gender based classifications for
applying "traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
women" and the use of gender as a "proxy for other, more germane bases of classification."
Id. at 726. The Court reasoned that a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be jus-
tified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately bur-
dened. Id. at 728. However, it found that in sharp contrast to such principle, the State had
failed to show that women lacked opportunities to obtain training in nursing or attain posi-
tions of leadership in that field, and that rather than compensating for discriminatory barriers
faced by women, the school's exclusionary policy tended "to perpetuate the stereotyped view
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However, analogous precedents on the subject do exist"" and the issue has
been hotly contested in recent cases involving the admission of women to
all-male institutions.'86
of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." Id. at 729. The Court also rejected the defendant's
attempt to justify its policy on grounds that single-sex educational institutions are specifically
exempted from the provisions of Title IX, noting that although the Court gives deference to
congressional decisions and classification, neither Congress nor a state can validate a law that
denies constitutional rights. Id. at 732.
185. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. 718; cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635-6 (1950) (holding
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state to
distinguish between students of different races in professional and graduate education in a
state university); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-3 (1948) (rejecting efforts to
maintain racial segregation through the operation of separate law schools); Vorchheimer v.
School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d. Cir. 1976) (holding that where two public single-sex high
schools offered equal educational opportunities and attendance was voluntary, admission regu-
lations based on gender classification did not violate the Equal Protection Clause), affd by an
equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
186. Cases include: Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993) (Citadel) (involving chal-
lenges by women applicants to state-supported military colleges having only male students);
United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Vir. 1994), affd, 44 F.3d 1229, (4th Cir. 1995)
(VMI II); United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Vir. 1991), vacated and remanded,
976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 2431 (1993) (VMI I) (collectively referred to
as VMI; cf. United States v. Fordice, 105 U.S. 717 (1992) (plaintiffs, including the United
States Government, attacked maintenance by the State of Mississippi of an alleged de jure
segregated college and university system despite the implementation of race neutral gover-
nance policies).
In VMI I, the district court disclaimed the adoption of a "separate, but equal" rationale,
but nevertheless denied a woman the right of admission to the all-male institution, sanction-
ing the creation on the campus of a private women's institution of "an all-female program
that will achieve substantially similar outcomes in an all-female environment" and finding that
a legitimate pedagogical basis existed "for the different means employed to achieve the sub-
stantially similar ends." VMI I, 852 F. Supp. at 481. In affirming this decision, the court of
appeals stated that the justification for the all-male program was not maleness, as distin-
guished from femaleness, but rather the homogeneity of gender in the processes of the institution,
which were related to the essence of its education and training. Such processes were deemed by
the court to include an "adversative" method, pitting males against males; 'leveling" activities
involving an absence of privacy; and physical training, which would require a "dual track
program" for women to achieve "equality in effect." VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1233. The court noted
findings of a special task force that women students would be better served by a program
which de-emphasized the military methods associated with adversative processes and, instead,
utilized a structured environment emphasizing leadership training. The court concluded by
noting the benefits in the single-gender system of the institution and accepted the resultant
gender classification as being sufficient if "comparable in substance, but not in form and
detail." Id. at 1240.
When examined under the reasoning of Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, the decision in VMI II
seems to be poorly reasoned and badly flawed. In grounding its decision on the preservation
of an educational objective, which was deemed acceptable only for men and which would be
emasculated by the inclusion of women, the court ignored Hogan's abhorrence for exclusionary
policies based on gender that "exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are
presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior" and the use of
classifications for applying "traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of
men and women" to perpetuate the stereotyped view of particular activities as being exclu-
sively within the domain of a particular gender. Furthermore, these decisions collide with the
holding and emanations of Fordice, 105 U.S. 717, 738, which, though based on a "strict scru-
tiny" analysis, could have included judicial acceptance of a number of justifications for reten-
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Although the question of opportunity to participate in educational pro-
grams, including athletics, has created gender division under Title IX and
the federal Equal Protection Clause,187 both men and women athletes ap-
pear to accept general separation by gender in terms of athletic competition.
However, for such separation to be legally defensible, it must provide for
equality of treatment and the absence of gender depreciation. As courts have
determined that the disparate treatment standard of Title VII applies to Title
IX,"88 they have also determined that such standard also applies to claims
arising under the Equal Protection Clause."r9 Accordingly, legal remedies
tion of a "separate, but equal" system, grounded on the special value of historically black
institutions to persons of a particular race, see The Blacker the College, the Sweeter the Knowl-
edge?, J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. (Autumn 1994, No.5) at 49, but it refused to do so. In-
stead, it held that the exclusionary policies inherent in the dual educational system being
examined continued a practice of de jure racial segregation, which, through narrowly applied
admissions standards, effectively denied student choice to attend particular institutions, resulted
in the "unnecessary duplication of programs" and lacked financial soundness. Fordice, 505 U.S.
at 738.
In a stinging dissent in VMI II, Judge Phillips referred to Hogan and declared:
I believe that a comparable inquiry here could properly support a like rejection of
the various governmental objectives suggested by the Commonwealth-on the ba-
sis that they demonstrably are rationalizations compelled by the exigencies of this
litigation rather than the actual overriding purpose of the proposed separate-but-
equal arrangement. Such an inquiry-looking realistically to the historical record,
taking judicial notice of much of relevance that is known to the whole world and
of which we are not compelled to feign ignorance and holding the Common-
wealth to its appropriate stringent burden of justification would, I believe reveal
quite a different purpose. Specifically, I think it would support a confident and
fair conclusion that the primary, overriding purpose is not to create a new type
of educational opportunity for women, nor to broaden the Commonwealth's edu-
cational base for producing a special kind of citizen-soldier leadership, nor to
further diversify the Commonwealth's higher education system-though all of
these might result serendipitously from the arrangement-but is simply by this
means to allow VMI to continue to exclude women in order to preserve its his-
toric character and mission as that is perceived and has been primarily defined in
this litigation by VMI and directly affiliated parties.
44 F.3d 1229, 1247 (citations omitted).
Judge Phillips concluded his dissent by comparing the VMI program with the one to be
newly developed for women on a separate campus:
[T]he contrast between the two on all the relevant tangible and intangible criteria
is so palpable as not to require detailed recitation. If every good thing projected for
the [women's] program is realized in reasonably foreseeable time, it will necessarily be
then but a pale shadow of VMI in terms of the great bulk, if not all of those criteria.
Id. at 1250 (emphasis added).
The same court in Citadel ordered that the female student be admitted to the Citadel
because the institution failed to offer an alternative such as VMI. Citadel, 10 F.3d at 233. Fol-
lowing VMI II, lawyers for the Citadel were seeking to have the admission rescinded. See
Scott Jaschik, VMI Ruling Buoys the Citadel in Its Battle to Remain All-Male, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Feb. 10, 1995, at A33.
187. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §1. For the text of this provision, see supra note 38.
188. See Roberts II, 998 F.2d 824, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1993); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community
Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849
(1987).
189. See Andrews v. City of Philadephia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478-80 (3d Cir. 1990); Lipsett v.
University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F.
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for gender depreciation can be asserted by intercollegiate athletes under Title
IX and the Equal Protection Clause,"9° primarily through assertion of rights
for damages under Section 1983,191 state equal protection clauses,' 9 and
state gender equality provisions."3
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GENDER EQUITY IN
ATHLETICS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE THEORY OF GENDER
DEPRECIATION
Thus far, this Article has engaged in a critique of the weaknesses of the
numerical parity paradigm, espoused the virtues of the non-discrimination
paradigm, and sought to develop a legal theory for the implementation of
the non-discrimination paradigm. While such an analytical exercise has enor-
mous value simply by virtue of provoking further thought and helping to
redefine the parameters of the debate, it does very little from a practical
standpoint. It is one thing to describe what is wrong with current policy and
what direction public policy should go. It is quite another to actually say
how to get to Shambala.' 4 This section offers a few brief recommendations
for change."9
First, the theory of gender depreciation, described supra, should be incor-
porated into Title IX. Although such a change ideally would come from
congressional action, current caselaw would logically permit extension of the
Title VII standard into Title IX. 6 A judicial reinterpretation, however, is
Supp. 517, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that University's interest in obtaining favorable pub-
licity and in generating revenue through intercollegiate sports could not override University
women's constitutional right to equal protection of the law); cf. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d
1220, 1231 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that Title IX analysis under the disparate treatment
standard resolved the issues in the case. thus not necessitating addressing of the equal protec-
tion claim). The rationale in Title IX cases has strong parallels to equal protection decisions,
even though its adoption was based upon the spending power of Congress. See Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Plaintiffs have also been successful in assert-
ing claims for gender discrimination under state equal rights provisions. See, e.g., Blair v.
Washington State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379, 1382 (Wash. 1987).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (holding that any per-
son who, under color of state statute, ordinance, etc., deprives any citizen of his constitutional
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is liable to the injured party).
192. Most state constitutions contain provisions which have been interpreted as having the
same effect as the federal Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Equality Guar-
antees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (1985).
193. Many state constitutions also include a gender equal rights provision. See, e.g, COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 30. The State of Washington's provision was used to achieve reform of the
athletic program at Washington State University. See Blair, 740 P.2d at 1383--85.
194. According to many Buddhist traditions, Shambala is a highly enlightened society lo-
cated somewhere in the Himalayas. Cf. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957) (describing the
existence of such an enlightened culture in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado).
195. The author's recommendations assume that institutions of higher education will want
to continue to sponsor intercollegiate athletic programs. Given that athletic programs generally
are not self-sustaining, some institutions may not wish to continue to sponsor such programs.
This is particularly true of NCAA Division II and III programs.
196. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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problematic. 97 In a democratic society, substantive changes in the law
should be the product of action by the elected legislature or executive rule-
making, and not by the judiciary. 98 Congress should consider and imple-
ment amendments to Title IX which strengthen the law by expressly defining
discrimination to include gender depreciati6n.'99 If the original aspirations
that underlaid Title IX are ever to be realized, it will be necessary to place
more emphasis on the non-discrimination paradigm and the concept of gen-
der depreciation, and less emphasis on the numerical parity paradigm.
Second, more emphasis should be placed on the experiences of the vast
number of college students (approximately 94% of the total enrolled)2"
who do not play intercollegiate athletics,2"' but who have sufficient interest
and ability to play club or intramural sports.2 2 Although both Title IX and
the Athletic Regulations include club and intramural sports,2' the focus of
the OCR and judicial enforcement has been on the elite varsity athlete.204
Title IX should be a statute for everyone, not just those who are blessed
with outstanding athletic ability. In order to accomplish this objective, it will
be necessary for the OCR to change its enforcement approach and to rewrite
its current regulations.0"
Third, it is necessary to redefine the meaning of sports within the Title
IX context. To date, the term "sports" has meant participation on a varsity
197. Aside from the concerns about the proper role of the judiciary, explained infra note
198 and accompanying text, there is also a concern about the time involved to achieve nation-
al uniformity. For example, a decision in a court of appeals is binding only on that circuit
and it has only persuasive authority in the rest of country. Indeed, despite the magnitude of
the recent victories for women athletes, these decisions are binding only in the First, Third,
and Tenth Circuits. The issues have yet to be litigated in other circuits.
198. As Judge Learned Hand once observed, "For myself it would be most irksome to be
ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assured-
ly do not." LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
199. The authors do not believe that such amendment would have to be extensive. A
simple statement of a private right of action for gender depreciation incorporating the standards
of Title VII probably would suffice.
200. While the percentage of high school students who play interscholastic sports is higher,
it is still less than a majority. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. A 2000 person high
school can still only have 12-15 people on the varsity basketball team.
201. Unfortunately, the reform efforts of Congress continue to focus on the elite athlete.
For example, 130 Members of Congress have suggested that Title IX be reformed by clarifying
the meaning of the second and third prongs of the three prong test. See Members of Congress
Seek New Policy Interpretation, NCAA NEWS (Overland Park, Kan.), July 19, 1995, at 2. This
proposal, however, does nothing to address the needs of the non-elite athlete.
202. Although a higher percentage of the population participates in high school athletics, it
is still relatively small. See supra notes 119, 200 and accopanying text.
203. See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 2.
204. For example, a review of a relevant Letter of Findings fails to reveal a single instance
where the OCR has given significant attention to compliance with Title IX in club and intra-
mural programs, e.g., Letter from John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, OCR, U.S.
Department of Education, to Dr. John Welty, President, California State University, Fresno
36-37 (Apr. 6, 1994) (on file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy) (investigation con-
ducted only with respect to intercollegiate teams at the University).
205. For a critique of the OCR's past enforcement efforts, see generally the JOHNSON STUDY,
supra note 2.
Volume 3:1 1996
STILL ON THE SIDELINES 45
team or, to a much lesser extent, on a club or intramural team. Yet, there
are thousands of persons who participate as individuals in such sports as
running, tennis, racquetball, swimming, golf, weight lifting, and aerobics.
Inequities in these areas, such as wide disparities between men's and wo-
men's locker rooms in campus recreation centers or in the availability of
playing fields, courts, pools, and courses for "pick-up" games and individual
activity, are never addressed. It is time to realize that all students who wish
to engage in athletic activity are entitled to non-discriminatory treatment just
like members of competitie teams. Moreover, although cloaked historically
with views that deem them non-participants and see them as symbols of
male dominance, contemporary cheerleading and dance teams that compete
with teams from other schools include a substantial number of athletes.
Today's "stunts" and movements in these activities require enormous flexi-
bility, strength, stamina, coordination, and balance, all characteristics that
legitimizes them as sports, which should be recognized. A person who, be-
cause of his or her outstanding gymnastics ability, is given a scholarship to
be a cheerleader or a member of a dance team should be treated the same
way as a person who, because of his or her ability to shoot a jump shot, is
giien a basketball scholarship.
Fourth, more emphasis should be placed upon the development of ath-
letic skills at levels below college. Some gender equity advocates maintain
that building women's athletic programs on the college level will necessarily
encourage the development of skills among girls in elementary, middle, and
high school2". Although such action is far better than the neglect and in-
difference that has historically been afforded to women students, a better ap-
proach may be to emphasize the development of athletic skills at the ele-
mentary, middle, and high school levels. If skills are developed at the lower
levels, there will be interest by the time these students reach the top. More-
over, those young people who play at the bottom, but who are not blessed
with the skills to play at the top, likely will become the much needed fan
base for women's sports and more likely to participate in club and intramu-
ral sports."7
Fifth, we call for greater emphasis on helping young women in the
inner-city develop athletic skills.2"8 Many of the women's intercollegiate
206. See, e.g., Janet Justus, Focus On Intercollegiate Athletics Sports Reform: College Athletics in
Flux, 22 J.C. & U.L. 48, 54 (1995).
207. In other words, the authors believe that young women who play basketball in ele-
mentary, middle, and high school, are far more likely to become fans of women's basketball
in college than if they never played.
208. A recent newspaper story, Mark Kiszla, Black Girls Face a Stigma on Blacktops, DENY.
POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at 1D, carried the following introduction, "They might as well post a sign
on every basketball court in Denver's inner city: Go home, girl, you don't belong here."
The story related the continuance of a stereotype that black girls are supposed to sit in
the stands and cheer as the boys dunk. It pointed out that although Colorado has held a
prep tournament for girls' basketball for the past twenty years, no team from the inner-city
Prep League has ever won a championship. Moreover, of eight teams in the recent class 5A
state quarterfinal, only 11 girls of Afro-American descent were participants. The story dis-
closes that the Colorado example is not a regional anomaly. It notes that according to NCAA
statistics, although black males earn 60% of Division I basketball scholarships, black females
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sports, such as tennis, golf, field hockey, swimming, synchronized swim-
ming, lacrosse, fencing, crew, and, to a lesser extent, soccer and softball, are
simply not played by inner-city youth. Thus, it is virtually impossible for
young women in the inner-city to earn a college scholarship for these sports.
While young women should have equal athletic opportunities, this equality
of opportunities should not be limited to sports usually not available to or
played by inner-city youth.
Sixth, an expenditure cap on intercollegiate athletics should be put in
place as a means of defusing the increasing polarization between men and
women.2' Under the terms of such an expenditure cap, total athletic ex-
penditures by an institution would be limited to a particular amount.
210
Travel outside of the immediate region would be limited.2 ' In addition,
there would be minimum and maximum scholarships and expenditures for
each sport.212 Such a cap would assure that all athletes, regardless of their
gender and whether their sport was a "revenue" sport, would have similar
experiences. Moreover, because it would be impossible for some schools to
spend their way to success as currently happens, it is quite likely that col-
lege athletics would become more competitive because of the diffusion of
talent and equalization of resources. However, because of the vulnerability of
such an arrangement to application of the antitrust laws, an appropriate
statutory exemption might be required.21 3
Seventh, we propose greater general enforcement of Title IX by the OCR
and, at the same time, for the OCR to end its emphasis on the
micromanagement of athletic programs. Although there are over 1000 inter-
receive only 36% of such grants from comparable women's collegiate teams. Lack of funding
for inner city programs is identified as a major source of the problem. Id.
209. For example advancing to a bowl game or to the next round of the NCAA tourna-
ment should not be a substantial windfall for an institution.
210. The reason for this proposal is quite simple. It is impossible to ignore the reality that
most intercollegiate athletic programs are in dire financial straits. As much as institutions
would like to simply increase women's sports, the money does not exist. Therefore, unless
new revenue sources are found, institutions will have to cut men's sports in order to finance
increases in women. Although there are numerous examples of waste in big time college foot-
ball. According to the National Women's Law Center, only about 10% of the football pro-
grams in NCAA Division I-A are self-sustaining. Carol Herwig, Women Aim to Preserve Title
IX, USA TODAY (Arlington, Va.), Feb. 3, 1995, at 7C. As a practical matter, the cuts are not
going to come in football. Rather, the cuts are going to come in the men's non-revenue
sports.
211. As exciting as such contests may be, there is no real reason for institutions on one
coast to journey to the opposite coast.
212. Without such a provision, institutions could simply emasculate their non-revenue
sports in order to fund football.
213. Ironically, application of the federal antitrust laws might impair the generation of in-
creased competition through the imposition of an expense cap. For example, see National
College Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), where the NCAA's efforts to
establish a centralized marketing arrangement for televising college football, which limited the
total number of games which could be shown and the number of appearances by any one
team, was held to violate such laws. Also, see the superb analysis of this case in WEISTART &
LOWELL, supra note 177, § 5.12 (1985 Supp.), noting that the court emphasized consumer pref-
erence instead of educational goals and focused on the limitations on output by competitors
in reaching its decision.
Volume 3:1 1996
STILL ON THE SIDELINES 47
collegiate athletic programs and several thousand high school programs,
most institutions have never been subjected to an OCR review. But, when
the OCR does review a program, it is obsessed with minute details for an
extended period of time rather than going on to another institution.214 Ac-
cordingly, a few institutions are subjected to federal micromanagement while
the overwhelming majority continue to ignore the law.
Eighth, the NCAA and the various athletic conferences need to be far
more proactive with respect to solving gender equity issues. As a practical
matter, the OCR is not able to review every institution. Thus, the athletic
conferences and the NCAA must review themselves and must enforce appro-
priate penalties upon discovering Title IX violations.215 At present, the
NCAA imposes major sanctions for seemingly minor violations of its bureau-
cratic code, but does nothing when one gender is severely depreciated, or
equal access to athletic opportunities denied to athletes of that same gen-
der.216 Furthermore, athletic personnel at many institutions appear to share
the view that nothing needs to be done to further gender equity in athletics
until the OCR finds a violation or a suit is instituted. Such an attitude is
reprehensible and has no place in the administration of an institution of
higher education. The NCAA member institutions should adopt rules to
assure compliance with Title IX and make the lack of such compliance sub-
ject to ratings of non-acceptability by peer review teams. Furthermore,
NCAA members should enact stronger rules barring sexual harassment and
gender discrimination or depreciation in intercollegiate programs. Violations of
such rules would be treated just as seriously as recruiting violations and
would call for major sanctions against the offending institution.
Finally, Title IX should be applied, by a change in the law or applicable
regulations, to require that the collective sports programs of an institution
must provide all students equal opportunities in intercollegiate, intramural,
and club sports. Furthermore, the law should be interpreted or changed so
as to clearly contemplate specific private rights of action, including class
214. The level of detail which must examined in reviews of athletic programs according to
the Investigator's Manual shows the preoccupation with minutiae. See supra note 147; cases
cited supra notes 4-6.
215. The NCAA's process of athletic certification is a step in the right direction. However,
the certification effort has, thus far, been extremely slow and largely toothless. See First Round
of Certification Decisions Completed, NCAA NEWS (Overland Park, Kan.), Mar. 18, 1995, at 1.
The athletic certification process is meant to ensure that NCAA Division I member insti-
tutions remain compliant with the operating principles and bylaws of the NCAA covering
four basic areas - governance and rules compliance, academic integrity, fiscal integrity, and
commitment to equity. At least once every five years, each member institution must complete
a self-study which is verified and evaluated through external peer review. Decisions regarding
certification are made by the Committee on Athletics Certification. Id.
216. For example, the NCAA charges an athlete with a year of eligibility if that athlete
plays one play in one game. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIc ASS'N, 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL §
14.2.4.1. In addition, the NCAA charges an athlete with a year of eligibility even if the athlete
is injured in the first half of the season. Id. § 14.2.5(b) Moreover, the NCAA could deny
eligibility to a freshman whose high school grades and ACT or SAT test scores exceed mini-
mum standards, but who is 1/2 unit short of a "core course," such as two years in the
natural or physical sciences. Id. § 14.3.1.3.
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actions, and afford a full range of remedies, including damages and/or in-
junctive relief under Title IX. Such injunctive relief should be available in the
case of flagrant violations to halt inequities in an institution's athletic pro-
gram until the institution obtains a court-approved plan for compliance.217
VII. CONCLUSION
The scope of the recent judicial decisions involving the application of
Title IX to intercollegiate athletics is breathtaking.21 After years of struggle,
young women pave finally won the right to numerical parity in intercolle-
giate athletics with their male counterparts.219 Yet, while these victories are
significant,' 2 they do little or nothing to address the many examples of
discrimination suffered by young women in intercollegiate, club, and intra-
mural athletics.22" ' In effect, the recent decisions completely embrace the
paradigm of numerical parity while largely ignoring the paradigm of non-
discrimination' In order to address problems which have been largely ig-
nored, it is necessary to de-emphasize the numerical parity paradigm and
instead emphasize the non-discrimination paradigm. This will involve the
further development of a theory of gender depreciation.,
However, while urging that more attention to the non-discrimination
paradigm be paid, it must be re-emphasized that both the numerical parity
and the non-discrimination paradigms have their role and are vitally impor-
tant to the achievement of true gender equity. Without the numerical parity
paradigm and its emphasis on representation, there will be very few "sym-
bols" or "role models" for young women. This inspiration is critical. .Young
people must realize that people like them can succeed and attain positions of
authority. However, without the non-discrimination paradigm and its em-
phasis of equal treatment, it will be impossible for many women to truly
succeed. If women are subjected to an environment in which their gender is
217. See, e.g., Roberts II, 998 F.2d. 824, 833 (10th Cir. 1993).
218. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
219. This statement assumes that the decisions will not be overturned by congressional
action or by a Supreme Court decision. As explained supra notes 110-15 and accompanying
text, there are serious ongoing efforts to overturn these decisions.
220. Moreover, there is evidence that women's sports are being increasingly accepted by
mainstream America. See Ailene Voisin, Getting a Toehold: Female Sports Gaining Exposure, Ac-
ceptance in Eyes of America, ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb. 1, 1995, at C5.
221. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
222. Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on race-based set
asides, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2100 (1995), there is some
question as to whether the numerical parity paradigm, with its emphasis on quotas and
group rights, will survive.
223. There are current cases which appear to employ theories of gender depreciation. For
example, Henri Ann Nelson, a member of Denver's exclusive Cherry Hills Country Club, has
filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Division protesting the fact that men may
reserve tee times 48 hours in advance while women may only reserve 24 in advance. Ann
Carnahan, Woman Cries Foul as Men Cry "Fore," ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Mar. 14,
1995, at 4A. Similarly, a Colorado school district transferred a male teacher because of alleg-
edly anti-gay remarks and actions perceived to constitute harassment. Mary George, Longmont
Coach Transferred, DENY. PosT, Mar. 10, 1995, at B2.
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constantly depreciated, then the role models will never be more than token
symbols. The current state of the legal profession illustrates this point. 4 If
young women are going to grow up to be successful lawyers, it is important
that they have successful role models like Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,' 2
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,"6  Attorney General Janet Reno, 227 and
others. 8 At the same time, neither young women nor young men will suc-
ceed in law if law firms are allowed to continue their traditions of gender
depreciation. 9
Therefore, in calling for greater emphasis on the principles of the non-
discrimination paradigm, we are not calling for the wholesale abandonment
of the numerical parity paradigm. Rather, we are asking advocates and the
judiciary to realize that exclusive emphasis on the numerical parity para-
digm, which has been the norm to date, will not fully achieve the goals of
Title IX.' If Title IX is going to be more than the quixotic crusade that it
was for twenty years," there must also be an emphasis on the non-dis-
crimination paradigm.
224. When Mr. Snow graduated from the Duke University School of Law in 1966, there
was only one woman in his class. In contrast, women represented 36% of the graduating
class in 1992 and 43% of the graduating class in 1993.
225. In 1981, Justice O'Connor was the first woman to sit on the United States Supreme
Court.
226. In addition to her long record as a successful advocate of women's rights, Justice
Ginsburg became the second woman to sit on the United States Supreme Court in 1993.
227. In 1993, Ms. Reno became the first woman to serve as United States Attorney Gener-
al. However, 11 states currently have women as their attorney general, including Colorado,
Hawaii, New Jersey, and Utah.
228. Virtually every state has at least one woman on its highest court. One state, Minneso-
ta, has a female majority.
229. For example, many law firms are unsympathetic to child care problems, and require
long hours of their employees which can create difficulties in child rearing. While these prob-
lems in theory should fall equally on both young men and young women, in practice they
disproportionately fall on young women.
230. Indeed, there is evidence that institutions will achieve Title IX compliance by slashing
men's sports rather than promoting women. For example, the State University of New York
at Albany is dropping three men's sports for 1995-96 in order to comply with Title IX. USA
TODAY (Arlington, Va.), Mar. 2, 1995, at 11C. Similarly, the men's basketball coach at Georgia
State University claims he was fired because he refused a pay cut designed to bring his sala-
ry in line with that of the women's basketball coach. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash-
ington, D.C.), Feb. 10, 1995, at A35.
231. See Alexander Wolff, The Slow Track, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 28, 1992, at 52.

